At the onset of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, few military observers held any illusions about the effectiveness of Russia’s attack helicopters. Derided as outdated and vulnerable, they were dubbed “flying coffins” by both Western analysts and Ukrainian troops. But just three years later, those same aircraft are rewriting the playbook of modern air warfare.
The transformation is not merely tactical or technological—it’s strategic. What began as a catastrophic misuse of Cold War-era doctrine has become a case study in adaptation under fire. Russian rotary-wing aircraft, once symbolic of failure and futility, are now shaping frontline operations and influencing NATO threat models. According to Lieutenant Colonel Emiliano Pellegrini of NATO’s Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC), Russia’s helicopter corps has gone from “Kyiv’s punchline to Kyiv’s nightmare.”
In the early stages of the war, Russian helicopter forces were decimated. An initial deployment included 75 Kamov Ka-52 “Hokum-B” helicopters, 55 Mil Mi-28 “Havocs,” and 95 Mil Mi-24/35 “Hinds.” By March 2023, Russia had lost 59 helicopters: 42 were shot down in flight, and 17 were destroyed on the ground. Nearly a third of the fleet was rendered inoperable. The losses, particularly among Ka-52s, were staggering—these aircraft alone accounted for 62% of the downed helicopters.
Why did this happen? Pellegrini explains it bluntly: “Russia treated helicopters like flying artillery—low, slow, and exposed.”
Helicopters were flown at treetop level to evade radar but lingered too long when firing unguided rockets, making them easy targets. They flew into kill zones saturated with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), like U.S.-made Stingers and U.K.-supplied Starstreaks. Ukrainian troops, often positioned in small hunter-killer teams, used ambush tactics to great effect.
JAPCC data reveals that 49% of helicopter losses in the first year were due to MANPADS. Another 22% fell to anti-aircraft artillery, 17% to small arms fire, and 12% to direct anti-tank weaponry. The performance gap between Russian and NATO helicopters was glaring, and morale among Russian air crews plummeted.
Grounded: The Struggle to Maintain Air Assets
Beyond combat losses, Russian helicopters faced a logistical nightmare. Open-source intelligence gathered by JAPCC and Bellingcat indicated that up to 33% of the fleet was grounded at any given time due to combat damage, parts shortages, or inadequate maintenance. With Western sanctions biting and supply chains faltering, Russia’s aging helicopter fleet was hanging by a thread.
Technical issues compounded the problem. The Ka-52’s targeting system was known for inaccuracy caused by vibration. Pilots often had to rely on visual cues instead of digital targeting. Moreover, outdated infrared countermeasures left the aircraft vulnerable to heat-seeking missiles.
By mid-2024, however, something changed. Russia began introducing substantial upgrades to its helicopter force. A new generation of Ka-52s came equipped with software patches that stabilized targeting optics. Infrared jamming pods and flares were added to reduce susceptibility to MANPADS. The Mi-28 and Mi-35 platforms were retrofitted with electronic countermeasures, updated avionics, and radar warning receivers.
Pellegrini points to these changes as crucial: “This wasn’t about reinventing the helicopter. It was about making them smart enough to survive.”
Another shift was operational. Russian helicopters began employing stand-off tactics, launching guided missiles from outside MANPADS range. The Vikhr-1 and Ataka missiles, once considered unreliable, were improved for longer range and higher accuracy. Pilots now conducted attacks from up to 8 km away, coordinating with drones for targeting and post-strike assessment.
Russian doctrine also changed. Rather than flying solo or in pairs, helicopters operated in networked units with ground forces, UAVs, and electronic warfare platforms. These multi-domain strike teams blurred the line between air and ground units, creating a hybrid warfighting model.
The effects on the battlefield were stark. In sectors like Kupiansk and Avdiivka, Ukraine’s forces reported a noticeable uptick in precision strikes from rotary-wing aircraft. “They don’t need to get close anymore,” said a Ukrainian general staff officer in March 2025. “We can hear the whine of the rotor, but by the time we look up, something’s already exploded.”
Ukraine’s once-formidable air defense network is now strained. With Russia’s helicopters flying further from the front and coordinating with loitering drones and cruise missiles, the burden on Ukrainian defenders has multiplied. Soviet-era Igla systems and even Western-supplied MANPADS are struggling to track targets that no longer linger within range.
“They’re not invincible,” noted Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Pavlenko. “But they’re a hell of a lot harder to hit.”
The psychological impact of Russia’s revitalized helicopter fleet cannot be understated. Early in the war, downed Ka-52s were celebrated across Ukrainian social media, a morale booster for a country fighting for survival. Now, those same helicopters strike under the cover of night, coordinating attacks that precede infantry pushes or disrupt supply routes.
Residents near the frontlines describe the distinctive sound of helicopters as a “harbinger of destruction.” Civilian infrastructure, logistics hubs, and even fortified positions have been hit with unnerving precision. In March 2025 alone, at least seven confirmed strikes by Ka-52s in the Donetsk region resulted in the destruction of Ukrainian armored vehicles and command posts.
The reversal in Russia’s rotary-wing performance has not gone unnoticed by NATO planners. What was once considered a weakness is now seen as a tactical asset in Russia’s evolving hybrid warfare strategy. Pellegrini emphasizes this point: “We used to say Russian helicopters were outdated and poorly integrated. Now they’re part of a broader, smarter, networked fight.”
Several NATO countries have initiated reviews of their own rotary-wing doctrines. The British Army is accelerating its upgrade program for the AH-64E Apache. Germany and Poland are investing in counter-UAV and anti-helicopter radar systems. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Defense is reportedly studying Russian adaptations to inform future vertical lift programs.
There is also concern about technology transfer. Iran and Syria have expressed interest in the upgraded Ka-52 systems. If Russia exports this revitalized platform to allied states or non-state actors, the threat matrix for Western forces operating abroad could shift dramatically.
The Ka-52, once a laughingstock of the skies, has become a symbol of Russia’s battlefield resilience. Retrofitted, rearmed, and backed by smarter doctrine, it no longer resembles the vulnerable platform of 2022. Instead, it is a precision killer—coordinated, lethal, and deeply embedded in Russia’s evolving war machine.
Ukraine has adapted brilliantly in many areas of the war. But the resurgence of Russian helicopters poses a growing challenge that demands new answers. For Kyiv, the nightmare is real: a once-failed air arm has risen from the ashes and returned as a formidable predator.
