Amid ongoing hostilities in Ukraine, Russia has intensified its campaign of long-range precision strikes using the newly introduced Grom-E1 missiles. These advanced guided missiles, with a range of 120 kilometers, have allowed Russian Aerospace Forces (RuAF) to target strategic locations deep within Ukrainian territory while staying outside the range of Ukraine’s air defense (AD) systems and American-supplied F-16 fighters armed with AMRAAM missiles. With these missiles launched from high-performance Su-30SM and Su-34 fighter jets, Russia has been able to conduct precise strikes with minimal risk to its aircraft.
The Grom-E1 missile’s first confirmed deployment was in early September 2024, where it targeted the Trade Center and Sports Palace in Kharkiv, both repurposed as military facilities by Ukrainian forces. The development and use of this missile have escalated tensions and raised concerns regarding the increased range and lethality of Russian strike capabilities.
The Grom-E1 and Grom-E2 missiles, part of the Grom family of air-launched weapons, were derived from the Kh-38 missile line, initially developed by the Technical Missile Corporation (TMC) in the 1990s. They represent an evolution in Russia’s missile technology aimed at achieving precise, long-range engagements that minimize exposure to enemy air defenses. Unlike their predecessor, the Kh-38 family, which includes a range of short-range, air-to-surface missiles, the Grom missiles integrate advanced winged designs and aerodynamic configurations, significantly extending their range and adaptability.
While the Kh-38 series was developed as a modular system with interchangeable seekers—such as semi-active laser homing (SALH), radar homing, and thermal imaging—the Grom missiles are optimized specifically for striking static targets. They rely on an inertial navigation system (INS) with Glonass satellite updates for precise targeting, but they are limited to non-moving targets due to their lack of a real-time seeker.
The Grom-E1’s extended range and accuracy make it an effective weapon for targeting fortified installations, logistics hubs, and troop concentrations far from the front lines.
The Grom-E1 missile’s specifications illustrate its unique position as a formidable tool in Russia’s aerial arsenal:
- Range: Up to 120 kilometers, allowing strikes on targets deep in Ukrainian-controlled areas without exposing Russian aircraft to Ukrainian air defenses.
- Warhead: A 315-kilogram high-explosive fragmentation warhead designed for maximum impact on buildings and static infrastructure.
- Propulsion: Powered by a two-stage rocket motor, the missile combines booster and sustainer phases to maintain a stable trajectory.
- Flexibility: Capable of engaging targets from various angles, including a 180-degree reversal to strike from the rear, adding unpredictability to its attack profile.
The Su-30SM and Su-34 fighters that carry these missiles can deploy them from altitudes of 500 to 12,000 meters at speeds of 140 to 445 meters per second, giving Russian forces a versatile, long-range option for precision strikes.
In contrast to the Grom-E1, Ukraine’s Hammer bombs, supplied by France, have a maximum range of approximately 64 kilometers—just over half that of the Grom-E1. This discrepancy in range significantly affects the operational capabilities of Ukrainian forces. When Ukrainian pilots engage Russian targets, they must enter the engagement envelope of Russia’s S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, as well as contend with advanced Russian fighters like the Su-30SM and Su-35S, which are armed with RVV-SD air-to-air missiles.
This forced proximity has made Ukrainian sorties inherently more hazardous and costly. The MiG-29s and Su-27s used by the Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) must penetrate deeper into contested airspace to deploy their weapons, making them vulnerable to both ground-based air defenses and intercepting Russian fighters.
The strategic use of Grom missiles extends beyond mere tactical advantage. The Grom-E1’s capacity to reach fortified Ukrainian positions has disrupted supply chains, demoralized forces, and created logistical bottlenecks. By allowing Russian pilots to stay outside the effective range of Ukrainian defenses, the Grom-E1 and its enhanced range and payload pose a multifaceted threat to Ukraine’s capacity to maintain secure supply lines and operate critical command and logistics facilities.
Additionally, these missiles provide the Russian military with enhanced operational flexibility. Russian forces are no longer constrained by the need to secure proximity-based missile launches, allowing them to carry out concentrated, efficient strikes on high-value Ukrainian targets.
The Grom family’s evolution from the Kh-38 series underscores Russia’s long-term investment in air-to-surface weaponry. The Kh-38, which started development in the 1990s, was initially intended to replace older missile families, including the Kh-25 and Kh-29, which were known for their limited range and target engagement capabilities. The Kh-38 itself is versatile, able to engage both static and mobile targets depending on the seeker head used.
This adaptability within the Kh-38 family is due to its modular design, featuring optional seekers—such as SALH for pinpoint accuracy on painted targets, radar homing for larger, high-value installations, and SATNAV for general navigation. The missile’s folding fins, designed to fit into internal weapon bays, are a technological innovation allowing the Kh-38 to be carried by advanced stealth platforms like the Su-57.
In addition to the Grom-E1, the Grom-E2 variant adds another layer of versatility. With a similar launch mass (598 kilograms) but a slightly modified design, the Grom-E2 trades the sustained propulsion system for an additional fragmentation warhead, totaling 480 kilograms. This alteration enhances the Grom-E2’s destructive power, although at a reduced range of 10 to 50 kilometers, compared to the Grom-E1.
The Grom-E2’s configuration aligns it with short-range, high-impact missions where increased explosive payloads are prioritized over range. Like the Grom-E1, the Grom-E2 is deployable at various altitudes and speeds, making it suitable for intense, close-proximity engagements or as a follow-up strike to disrupt infrastructure and logistics immediately behind front lines.
The deployment of Grom missiles, particularly the Grom-E1, reflects a shift in Russia’s tactical approach. Rather than relying solely on saturation bombardments or indiscriminate artillery shelling, the RuAF appears to be prioritizing targeted strikes against key Ukrainian assets. By using precision missiles, Russia aims to maximize impact while minimizing the resources expended per target. The Grom-E1’s design—characterized by foldable wings for aerodynamic lift—enables it to maintain high maneuverability and approach targets from unpredictable directions, complicating Ukrainian defense responses.
The precision of these strikes has also influenced Ukrainian military strategies, forcing them to fortify existing positions and adopt more decentralized deployment patterns. This shift has put additional strain on Ukraine’s logistical networks and disrupted established supply lines.
The introduction of Grom missiles, alongside other Russian advancements in missile technology, may have repercussions beyond the immediate Ukraine conflict. As the Grom-E1 and Grom-E2 illustrate the RuAF’s growing emphasis on stand-off, precision-guided munitions, it showcases a broader Russian commitment to developing asymmetric warfare capabilities that negate the technological advantages of adversaries.
The development and use of these missiles signal a potential trend towards a diversified Russian air warfare doctrine, prioritizing adaptability and precision over brute force. For NATO and other Western allies supporting Ukraine, this capability gap highlights the need for continued assistance, possibly including the supply of more advanced, longer-range strike options to bolster Ukraine’s defenses.
The Grom missiles’ versatility and design have invited comparisons to Western weapon systems like the Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER). By creating weapons that can be launched from outside the engagement envelope of Ukrainian and NATO-supplied defenses, Russia has effectively mimicked the core principles of American JDAM-ER weapons. However, while the JDAM-ER relies on glide capabilities to extend range, the Grom-E1’s propulsion system grants it added precision and range.
Another comparable Western system, the AGM-179 Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM), shares modular design principles with the Kh-38 series, as both are intended to replace older missile families. Yet, with an extended range and design modifications suited to asymmetric warfare, the Grom missiles underscore the evolving strategies of non-NATO powers in response to Western technological advancements.
