Russia has escalated its missile campaign against Ukraine with unprecedented intensity. Using a mix of Iskander-M ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, and potentially KN-23 systems, the Kremlin launched strikes that hit military installations, port infrastructure, and a U.S.-supplied Patriot air defense battery. The precision, scope, and tactical targeting of the attacks mark a significant evolution in Russia’s long-range strike strategy—and expose growing vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s defenses.
On May 22, an Iskander-M missile reportedly struck a field training site of Ukraine’s elite 1st Separate Special Forces Brigade. According to Russian military sources, the strike killed 70 Ukrainian troops, including 20 instructors. Independent verification of these casualties remains pending, but the nature of the target—a concentrated group of active and veteran combat personnel—suggests careful planning and real-time intelligence.
Later that day, a separate Iskander-M salvo struck a Patriot missile system site near the village of Ordzhonikidze in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Satellite images confirmed the destruction of key components, including the AN/MPQ-65 multifunction radar, the engagement control station, and two missile launchers. This marked one of the most significant hits against NATO-provided air defense hardware since the conflict began.
On May 23, Russian missiles targeted Odesa’s port, reportedly striking a container ship unloading military cargo and a nearby warehouse. Ukrainian port authorities confirmed a major fire and secondary explosions—likely from stored ammunition or fuel—suggesting that the cargo indeed included military equipment. Ukrainian officials claimed the port strike was a war crime; Moscow insists it was targeting legitimate military logistics.
May 24 and 25 brought what some are calling Russia’s most concentrated aerial assault of the war. Dozens of drones and missiles—including Iskander-M and KN-23 ballistic missiles—rained down on Kyiv and surrounding areas. Ukraine’s Air Force reported it intercepted 6 of the 9 ballistic missiles aimed at the capital, but the damage was still extensive. Several energy facilities were hit, and further damage to air defense assets was reported.
Central to this new phase of strikes is the Iskander-M—a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) system that has long been a cornerstone of Russia’s tactical missile force. Operational since the early 2000s, the Iskander-M is anything but conventional.
It flies on a quasi-ballistic trajectory and performs unpredictable in-flight maneuvers. Coupled with a very low radar cross-section and the use of radar decoys, these characteristics make it exceedingly difficult for modern air defense systems to track and intercept.
Contrary to recent statements by Ukraine’s Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat, who suggested the missile has been upgraded with new countermeasures, defense experts argue these features have been integral to the Iskander’s design from day one.
“The Iskander-M was built to defeat the very systems now trying to intercept it,” said military analyst Andriy Sokolov. “It’s not that Russia suddenly made it smarter. It’s that Ukraine is now facing more of them, used with better targeting and coordination.”
The destruction of a Patriot missile battery near Dnipropetrovsk on May 22 has sparked renewed debate about the system’s vulnerability. While the Patriot PAC-3 is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles, its effectiveness depends on advanced radar guidance and timely targeting data. The Iskander’s maneuverability, high speed, and use of decoys reduce the window for interception and increase the risk of oversaturation.
The fact that an entire Patriot system—radar, control cabin, and launchers—was destroyed in a single strike suggests either a critical lapse in detection or deliberate exploitation of known weaknesses.
“The Patriot system is advanced, but it’s not invulnerable,” said James Reed, a former U.S. Army air defense commander. “If it’s not mobile, if the radar is jammed or decoyed, and if the enemy knows its location—then yes, it can be taken out.”
Ukraine has already asked for additional air defense systems and enhanced software updates from NATO partners. Ihnat acknowledged as much in a statement, saying, “It complicates the interception, but doesn’t make it impossible. I think our partners are already working to improve the system’s capabilities.”
A curious element in this missile escalation is the presence of the KN-23—a ballistic missile developed by North Korea that resembles the Iskander-M in appearance, but differs significantly in design and performance.
Russia is believed to have acquired or licensed the KN-23 from North Korea and potentially modified it for improved accuracy and effectiveness. Unlike the Iskander-M, which has pinpoint precision (~5–7 meters CEP), the KN-23 has a larger warhead and a CEP of around 30–50 meters. Reports indicate that Russia may be retrofitting the missile with enhanced navigation systems, radar decoys, or even payload-swapping technology to make it more effective.
Given the logistical and manufacturing strain of producing large numbers of Iskanders, deploying modified KN-23s could offer Russia a cheaper, scalable alternative for ballistic strikes.
Analysts warn that any Russian-led enhancement of the KN-23 could eventually be passed back to North Korea, boosting Pyongyang’s own missile capabilities and undermining regional stability in East Asia.
Meanwhile, Russia continues to evolve its drone strategy. The Geran-2—based on Iran’s Shahed-136—has become a key tool for striking soft targets and air defense radar units.
New variants of the Geran now reportedly include electro-optical sensors in place of warheads. These “spotter drones” fly in formation with explosive-laden units, identify targets with infrared or visible-light cameras, and relay coordinates to their armed counterparts in real time.
This tactic was apparently used in the May 24 attack on Kyiv, with spotter drones helping precision-target Ukrainian command posts and communication nodes.
The warheads themselves have also improved, from 50 kg in early versions to 90 kg in the latest models. Flight altitude adjustments and electronic warfare (EW) resistance enhancements—like Kometa SATNAV modules—further boost their operational utility.
While Ukrainian officials have claimed that Russia is deploying “upgraded” missiles, much of what is described as “new” has long been part of Russia’s playbook. The Iskander-M’s evasive capabilities, terminal phase decoys, and maneuverability are well-documented.
What may indeed be new are modifications to the KN-23 and the tactics surrounding their use. Russia seems to be integrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) more tightly with its missile units, ensuring more accurate strikes and better timing.
Moreover, the combination of drones and ballistic missiles—sometimes in layered “waves” designed to overload Ukrainian air defenses—is a clear sign of strategic evolution.
“The mix of drones and missiles in a staggered, multi-axis attack is textbook saturation warfare,” said Michael Kofman, director of the Russia Studies Program at CNA. “It’s not just about individual systems anymore; it’s about how they’re used together.”
If Russia continues to use ballistic and cruise missiles in tandem with drones and ISR assets, Ukraine’s current air defense coverage—already stretched—may not be enough.
The destruction of a Patriot system, coupled with evidence of improved targeting and saturation tactics, suggests that the days of intercepting 90%+ of incoming missiles could be over.
For Ukraine, this means more pressure on its Western partners—not just for resupply, but for deeper integration of intelligence and air defense software upgrades. It also highlights the urgent need for mobile, layered defenses that can adapt to rapidly changing threats.
For Russia, this phase of the war signals a shift toward strategic missile dominance: using a mix of precision strikes and volume firepower to degrade Ukraine’s will and capacity to fight.
Russia’s May 2025 missile campaign represents more than just firepower—it reflects a growing sophistication in how that firepower is deployed. Whether through improved integration of ballistic missiles and drones, tactical use of decoys, or potential collaboration with North Korea, Russia is redefining what a modern aerial assault looks like.
