Thailand’s Naval Modernization Hits Another Roadblock as South Korean Frigate Deal Faces Cancellation After Chinese Submarine Dispute

Hanwha Ocean

The Royal Thai Navy’s efforts to modernize its ageing fleet have encountered another setback after a government appeals panel recommended cancelling an existing frigate procurement tender and initiating a new bidding process, potentially delaying the acquisition of a major warship by several months.

The recommendation follows a complaint lodged by an unsuccessful bidder against the Navy’s decision to select South Korean shipbuilder Hanwha Ocean as the preferred contractor for the construction of one high-performance frigate worth approximately 16.73 billion baht (US$510 million).

The Appeals and Complaints Consideration Committee concluded that a complaint submitted by the Thai Frigate Building Consortium had sufficient grounds and that the issue significantly affected the procurement process. It subsequently advised the Navy to terminate the existing tender and conduct a fresh procurement in accordance with Thailand’s public procurement legislation.

Royal Thai Navy Commander-in-Chief Adm. Naret Wongtrakun said on November 16 that he was aware of the committee’s recommendation but had not yet received or examined the official document.

He indicated that the Navy would need to investigate the matter thoroughly before deciding its next course of action. The service has not formally announced whether it will comply with the recommendation or how it intends to proceed with the procurement.

The development comes just months after the Navy selected Hanwha Ocean in September 2026 as its preferred bidder for the frigate project. The selection was an initial procedural step toward negotiations over technical specifications, contractual conditions and the overall scope of the program before a final agreement could be signed.

Hanwha Ocean reportedly emerged ahead of five competing bidders: the Thai Frigate Building Consortium, which partnered with Spain’s Navantia; Singapore Technologies Engineering (ST Engineering); Turkey’s TAIS Gemi İnşa ve Teknoloji A.Ş.; Turkey’s ASFAT (Askeri Fabrika ve Tersane İşletme A.Ş.); and South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI).

All five unsuccessful bidders reportedly submitted complaints after the Navy rejected their proposals. The Navy initially dismissed the complaints, but the Appeals and Complaints Consideration Committee subsequently examined them alongside the findings of the Navy’s procurement selection committee.

Following its review, the appeals panel determined that complaints from four companies lacked sufficient grounds. However, it found merit in the complaint submitted by the Thai Frigate Building Consortium, concluding that the issue was serious enough to undermine the procurement process.

Citing Section 119, Paragraph 2 of Thailand’s Public Procurement and Supplies Administration Act B.E. 2560 (2017), the committee recommended terminating the existing procurement and restarting the process in compliance with the applicable legal requirements.

One of the central concerns surrounding the original tender was that Hanwha Ocean was reportedly the only company among the six bidders to pass the Navy’s technical evaluation.

Several competing proposals were disqualified for failing to satisfy technical requirements, submitting incomplete documentation or failing to comply with the tender conditions. The outcome raised questions about whether the procurement specifications were excessively restrictive or potentially structured in a way that benefited a particular shipbuilder.

The Navy, however, defended its selection process, maintaining that all participating companies had been provided equal opportunities. It argued that the technical requirements were necessary to ensure the vessel’s operational effectiveness, reliability and long-term value.

The appeals panel’s intervention has therefore introduced a significant legal and procedural complication into a project that was expected to move toward contract negotiations.

A fresh tender could take approximately another six months, depending on the procurement process, technical revisions and subsequent evaluations. Such a delay would push back contract finalization, construction and the eventual delivery of the frigate.

For the Royal Thai Navy, the consequences extend beyond the immediate procurement dispute. The service is attempting to replace ageing surface combatants while strengthening its ability to conduct maritime surveillance, protect strategic infrastructure and respond to emerging security challenges across Southeast Asian waters.

The proposed frigate is expected to provide a combination of surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare and air-defense capabilities. It is also intended to offer modern command-and-control systems, data-link connectivity and the ability to operate alongside other naval and joint-service platforms.

These capabilities are increasingly important for protecting Thailand’s maritime interests, commercial shipping routes, offshore energy infrastructure and exclusive economic zone.

The delay could postpone the introduction of these capabilities, although its immediate operational consequences will depend on the availability and readiness of the Navy’s existing vessels.

Thailand currently operates several ageing frigates that require replacement, including two Naresuan-class and four Chao Phraya-class vessels. The Navy’s most modern frigate is the Bhumibol Adulyadej-class ship, commissioned in 2019 and constructed by Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, which subsequently became part of Hanwha Ocean.

The commissioning of the Bhumibol Adulyadej demonstrated Thailand’s interest in acquiring more capable and technologically advanced surface combatants. However, the Navy has indicated that additional vessels would be necessary to meet its long-term fleet requirements.

Its 2023 White Paper outlined an ambition to operate eight frigates by 2037. Rather than financing the entire modernization program through a single large procurement, the Navy has pursued a phased acquisition strategy intended to spread the financial burden over several years.

Consequently, even the procurement of one additional frigate represents an important step toward the service’s broader force-development objectives.

Although a single vessel would not fundamentally transform Thailand’s naval combat capabilities, it would provide an additional modern platform and help address the gradual deterioration of the existing fleet.

A fresh tender would therefore create uncertainty over the Navy’s procurement schedule and potentially force it to continue relying on older warships for longer than anticipated.

The frigate procurement setback is particularly significant because the Royal Thai Navy has already experienced years of difficulties in acquiring a new submarine from China.

Thailand’s submarine acquisition program is among the country’s longest-running and most controversial defense procurement projects.

The Navy initially announced plans in 2015 to acquire three Chinese attack submarines based on the Yuan-class design. The proposed S26T submarine was a 2,550-ton vessel measuring approximately 77.7 metres in length and designed to incorporate a Stirling-type air-independent propulsion system.

However, financial constraints eventually forced the government to reduce the planned acquisition to a single submarine. A contract was signed with China in May 2017, marking an important attempt to restore Thailand’s underwater warfare capability, which had effectively disappeared following the retirement of its last operational submarines in the 1950s.

Construction of the first submarine began with steel cutting on September 4, 2018, and delivery was initially expected in 2023–24.

The project subsequently encountered a major obstacle when Germany refused to export the MTU-396 diesel engines originally specified for the submarine.

The restrictions were associated with the European Union’s arms embargo on China, which prevented the transfer of the German-made engines for installation in a Chinese-built military submarine.

The engine dispute threatened to derail the entire acquisition. Former Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha indicated that Thailand could terminate the agreement if China could not provide the German engines specified in the original contract.

Beijing subsequently proposed replacing the German propulsion system with Chinese-made CHD620 diesel engines, reportedly developed through reverse engineering and manufactured by a Chinese state-owned submarine builder.

The proposal triggered prolonged negotiations between the two countries. Chinese representatives argued that the alternative engines were suitable for the submarine, while the Thai Navy expressed concerns about their reliability, operational performance and long-term durability.

The disagreement became the principal obstacle to completing the submarine acquisition.

Thailand had already paid approximately 7.7 billion baht (US$237 million) toward the contract. Cancelling the purchase therefore risked substantial financial losses and created political difficulties for the government.

In October 2023, the former Thai defence minister proposed an alternative solution: converting the submarine contract into an agreement for a Chinese-built frigate.

At the time, the minister acknowledged that the frigate option would slightly compromise the Navy’s capabilities compared with the submarine project but said the service could accept the alternative.

However, the proposal also encountered financial and political complications and was eventually shelved.

In a major reversal, Thailand’s Cabinet approved an amendment in August 2025 allowing the Chinese-built submarine to use the CHD620 engines instead of the originally specified German MTU-396 propulsion system.

The revised agreement was subsequently signed on September 16, 2025. China agreed to extend warranty and maintenance arrangements and provide additional support to the Royal Thai Navy.

The decision effectively revived the submarine program after years of uncertainty. However, the revised arrangement significantly extended the delivery schedule, with the vessel now expected to be delivered by late 2028.

The submarine’s prolonged delay has left Thailand without the underwater warfare capability it intended to restore through the acquisition. It has also forced the Navy to reconsider its force-development priorities while balancing competing requirements for submarines, frigates and other naval assets.

The latest frigate procurement dispute now threatens to create another delay in that modernization effort.

Taken together, the two programs illustrate the challenges Thailand faces in managing complex naval acquisitions involving foreign suppliers, technology-transfer restrictions, budgetary constraints and domestic procurement regulations.

The submarine dispute demonstrated how export controls and dependence on foreign propulsion technology can disrupt an otherwise established defense agreement. The frigate controversy, meanwhile, highlights the risks associated with procurement competition, technical evaluation and legal scrutiny.

For Thailand, the immediate priority will be to resolve the appeals process without compromising the transparency and credibility of the procurement system.

However, if the Navy is required to restart the frigate tender, the consequences will extend beyond a delayed contract. The service could face additional costs, prolonged capability gaps and further complications in implementing its long-term fleet modernization strategy.

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