Growing concerns over the capacity of the United States’ nuclear shipbuilding industrial base have prompted lawmakers to seek assurances that the Navy’s proposed Trump-class nuclear-powered battleships will not further strain an already overburdened system responsible for constructing aircraft carriers and submarines.
The issue emerged prominently during the House Armed Services Committee’s markup of the Fiscal Year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), where lawmakers approved an amendment requiring the Navy to explain how it intends to pursue the ambitious Trump-class program without disrupting existing nuclear vessel construction efforts.
The move follows congressional action last month that blocked the Navy from beginning construction of the first Trump-class battleship until key technologies and weapons systems associated with the program are deemed sufficiently mature.
At the center of the latest debate is concern that the Navy’s aggressive schedule for the new nuclear-powered battleship program—officially known as BBGN, or previously BBG(X)—could overwhelm a shipbuilding industry already struggling with delays, workforce shortages, and supply-chain bottlenecks.
Representative Joe Courtney, a Connecticut Democrat and senior member of the House Armed Services Committee, introduced the amendment, arguing that lawmakers must carefully evaluate the industrial consequences of launching another major nuclear shipbuilding effort.
“The committee continues to support efforts to expand the U.S. maritime industrial base and accelerate U.S. shipbuilding production,” the amendment states. “However, the committee is concerned about the possibility of strain on U.S. nuclear shipyards and maritime industrial base posed by the aggressive schedule proposed for producing a nuclear-powered BBG(X) platform.”
The Navy’s decision to make the Trump class nuclear-powered marked a significant departure from decades of naval procurement strategy. The service has not operated a nuclear-powered surface combatant since the retirement of its nuclear-powered cruisers in the 1990s. The concept was formally unveiled as part of the Navy’s latest long-range shipbuilding plan and has become a centerpiece of President Donald Trump’s broader “Golden Fleet” naval modernization initiative.
Under the Navy’s current plan, 15 Trump-class battleships would be acquired between Fiscal Years 2028 and 2055. Procurement is expected to occur roughly every other year, although two vessels are currently planned for consecutive fiscal years in 2030 and 2031.
The scale of the undertaking has alarmed some lawmakers.
Current estimates place the cost of each Trump-class vessel at approximately $17 billion, making it one of the most expensive warships ever envisioned by the Navy. The projected price exceeds the anticipated cost of the next three Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers, which are expected to cost between $13 billion and $15 billion each.
Beyond cost concerns, lawmakers are focused on the practical realities of building such ships.
The United States currently has only two shipyards certified to construct nuclear-powered naval vessels: Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia and General Dynamics Electric Boat. However, only Newport News actively builds nuclear-powered surface ships, including the Ford-class aircraft carriers.
Courtney’s amendment highlights the vulnerability this creates.
“The committee notes that the United States operates only two shipyards that are qualified to construct nuclear-powered vessels and that only one of these two shipyards actively constructs surface vessels,” the amendment states.
Lawmakers point to persistent delays affecting the Ford-class carrier program as evidence that the industrial base remains under significant pressure. Construction timelines for aircraft carriers currently under development—including the future USS Enterprise (CVN-80), USS Doris Miller (CVN-81), and USS William J. Clinton (CVN-82)—have been repeatedly pushed back due to labor shortages, supplier challenges, and production inefficiencies.
Committee members worry that introducing a new class of nuclear-powered surface combatants could exacerbate those issues.
“The committee is concerned that these factors, coupled with a lack of physical shipbuilding capacity, could be further exacerbated by a new nuclear-powered surface vessel program and without careful planning could jeopardize Ford-class delivery,” the amendment notes.
The concerns extend beyond shipyards themselves and into the broader nuclear propulsion supply chain.
A critical bottleneck involves the production of naval nuclear reactors. The U.S. Navy relies heavily on BWXT Technologies, the sole supplier responsible for manufacturing naval reactor components used in Ford-class aircraft carriers, Virginia-class attack submarines, and Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines.
BWXT recently received contracts totaling approximately $1.4 billion from the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, underscoring its central role in sustaining the Navy’s nuclear fleet.
According to Courtney’s amendment, reactor procurement typically begins two to three years before a vessel’s construction starts, while production timelines often stretch between six and eight years.
Given those lengthy lead times, lawmakers fear that accelerating Trump-class procurement could create competition for limited industrial resources and delay existing programs that are already under contract.
To address these concerns, the committee is directing the Secretary of the Navy and the Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program to submit a comprehensive report by March 1, 2027.
The report must outline the Navy’s strategy for designing and constructing the Trump class without interfering with current nuclear shipbuilding efforts.
Specifically, lawmakers are requesting detailed assessments of several key areas, including plans to reduce construction delays affecting CVN-80, CVN-81, and CVN-82; projected procurement and delivery timelines for the Trump-class program; the ability of existing nuclear-certified shipyards to support the new vessels without affecting submarine and carrier construction; and the capacity of the naval reactor industrial base to meet demand.
The report must also identify critical maritime suppliers, particularly those producing long-lead components or operating as sole-source providers, and evaluate their ability to support the Trump-class effort while maintaining existing production schedules.
The amendment reflects broader concerns in Congress about whether the Navy has adequately considered the industrial consequences of pursuing the battleship program.
Representative Christopher Deluzio, a Pennsylvania Democrat, raised additional questions through a separate amendment focused on the program’s technological and acquisition risks.
Deluzio argued that the Navy appears to be making optimistic assumptions regarding several aspects of the proposed battleship, including nuclear systems integration, ship design, production schedules, operational concepts, and overall affordability.
His amendment directs the Comptroller General to provide Congress with an independent assessment of the Trump-class business case no later than January 1, 2027.
The review would examine planned cost, schedule, and performance targets, as well as the assumptions underpinning those projections.
It would also assess the maturity and risk of new technologies required to build and sustain the battleship, evaluate how the Navy intends to employ the vessel within Distributed Maritime Operations concepts, and determine whether commercial best practices are being incorporated into acquisition planning.
Importantly, the review would also analyze the broader impact of the Trump class and other Golden Fleet initiatives on existing Navy shipbuilding programs.
The heightened scrutiny reflects growing skepticism among some lawmakers about the strategic rationale behind the battleship effort.
Although supporters argue that heavily armed nuclear-powered surface combatants could provide unmatched endurance, firepower, and deterrent value, critics question whether such vessels align with modern naval warfare requirements.
Others argue that finite shipbuilding resources may be better spent expanding submarine production, accelerating unmanned systems development, or addressing readiness shortfalls across the fleet.
Political realities may further complicate the program’s future.
Even if Congress ultimately authorizes continued development, major procurement decisions regarding the Trump class are unlikely to occur until after President Trump leaves office. That timing means future administrations will inherit responsibility for determining whether the program remains viable amid competing budget priorities and evolving strategic demands.
As a result, some observers view the recent congressional actions as an effort to slow the program’s momentum without directly challenging the administration’s vision for the Golden Fleet.
The House committee’s latest reporting requirement does not halt the battleship program outright. However, it raises a substantial barrier by forcing the Navy to demonstrate that the proposed vessels can be built without undermining existing aircraft carrier and submarine programs that are already experiencing significant strain.
Whether the Navy can provide convincing answers remains to be seen. What is clear is that lawmakers are increasingly focused on the industrial realities behind the ambitious proposal.
For now, the Trump-class battleship faces a difficult path forward. And as Congress demands greater scrutiny of costs, schedules, technology risks, and industrial capacity, the program’s future appears far less certain than when it was first announced.
