As world leaders prepare to gather in The Hague for one of NATO’s most pivotal summits in recent memory, tensions are mounting—not just with Russia, but within the alliance itself. At the center of the discord is U.S. President Donald Trump, whose unorthodox views on defense spending and Russia have sent shockwaves through the alliance of 32 nations.
Speaking to reporters Friday, President Trump made it clear he does not support the United States increasing its defense expenditure to 5% of GDP, a target that many NATO countries expect to discuss and possibly endorse at the upcoming summit.
“I don’t think we should, but I think they should,” Trump said, referring to America’s NATO partners. “We’ve been supporting NATO so long, in many cases, I believe, paying almost 100 percent of the cost. So I don’t think we should, but I think that the NATO countries should, absolutely.”
Trump’s comments underscore a widening transatlantic divide on fundamental issues, from collective defense spending to strategic priorities and the nature of the threat posed by Russia. As the alliance faces a turning point, this rift could not come at a more precarious time.
When NATO leaders convene in The Hague next week, many are hoping to issue a unified, unequivocal message that Russia remains the principal security threat to the Euro-Atlantic region. The alliance, reenergized after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, had previously declared Moscow “the most significant and direct threat to allies’ security and peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”
But consensus this year is elusive.
Behind closed doors, diplomats have struggled to finalize the wording of the summit communiqué. A key point of contention: whether the statement should explicitly name Russia as a primary threat. Several U.S. allies—particularly in Eastern Europe—are insisting on strong language that reflects the immediacy of the Kremlin’s threat. However, the Trump administration, supported by Hungary and Slovakia, has pushed for a watered-down version.
Drafts have bounced between formulations such as “threats, including Russia” or “the long-term threat posed by Russia to Euro-Atlantic security.” For countries like Poland, Estonia, and Lithuania—bordering or near Russia—such ambiguity is not just a diplomatic inconvenience but a national security concern.
“The verbal nuances may seem slight, but they mean a great deal,” said a Baltic diplomat, speaking anonymously due to the sensitivity of the negotiations. “We are being asked to spend more, send more troops, but if we don’t even call out the threat by name, how can we explain this to our people?”
The unease stems from more than just semantics. Since returning to office, President Trump has taken a starkly different approach to Russia compared to previous U.S. administrations. While publicly expressing occasional frustration with Vladimir Putin over his refusal to implement a ceasefire in Ukraine, Trump has avoided any substantial move to punish Moscow.
At the recent G7 summit in Florence, Trump stunned fellow leaders by arguing that Russia should never have been expelled from the group of major industrialized nations—referring to the 2014 ejection following Moscow’s annexation of Crimea.
“Russia brings a lot to the table,” Trump reportedly told counterparts, “and we need to be working with them, not against them.”
This conciliatory tone has alarmed both European leaders and many within Washington’s foreign policy establishment. They fear that Trump’s stance could erode the unity that NATO has shown since 2022 and embolden Moscow to further destabilize the region.
The rift goes beyond diplomatic language and touches a financial nerve at the heart of the alliance: defense spending.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO has accelerated efforts to meet and exceed the 2% of GDP defense spending guideline. In 2024, 23 out of 32 member states hit the 2% mark. Now, under pressure from Trump, the alliance is considering a new benchmark: 5% of GDP.
The demand has sent shockwaves through national capitals. While defense hawks in countries like Poland, the UK, and the Baltic states support the goal, others—including Germany, Italy, and Spain—view the figure as unrealistic and politically toxic.
President Trump’s own opposition to applying the 5% target to the United States adds further confusion.
“Trump wants other NATO members to hit 5%, but says America, which already spends more than any other country, shouldn’t have to,” said Rachel Rizzo, a fellow at the Atlantic Council. “This raises questions about whether the goal is strategic or political posturing.”
Indeed, the United States currently spends roughly 3.5% of its GDP on defense—a figure that dwarfs any other NATO member. Pushing allies toward 5% while exempting the U.S. may exacerbate long-standing tensions about burden-sharing and American leadership.
One of the most sensitive issues facing the alliance—support for Ukraine—is also being managed with caution.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is expected to attend the summit, but his role will be deliberately limited to avoid a potential diplomatic clash with President Trump. According to multiple NATO officials, Zelensky will participate in side meetings, but not the main plenary sessions.
There will be no formal discussion on Ukraine’s long-term bid to join NATO—a dream that Kyiv has held since 2008, and one that has gained momentum in recent years.
“The U.S. does not see Ukrainian security as essential to European security,” said Kurt Volker, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO. “Our European allies do, so they feel that if Putin is allowed to prevail in Ukraine, or if Ukraine does not survive as a sovereign, independent state, they are at risk.”
That divergence is critical. While countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltics argue that Ukraine is the frontline in Europe’s defense, Trump’s White House sees the war as a regional matter—not one that warrants open-ended American commitment.
NATO diplomats are expected to include vague language linking increased defense spending to “supporting partners under threat,” a nod to Ukraine without naming it directly.
The Trump administration’s focus appears to be pivoting toward China rather than Russia—a view reflected in recent comments from U.S. officials.
“Russia is the near threat,” said U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker. “But China is obviously a big challenge for all of us, and we need to be allied and address those threats as well.”
This view is not shared equally across NATO. European states, especially those closer to Russia’s borders, argue that while China is a long-term global competitor, Russia remains the clear and present danger to European peace.
Camille Grand, senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, believes the alliance is facing an identity crisis.
“How does the United States view Russia?” Grand asked. “So far, we haven’t really got an answer. And that lack of clarity risks undermining everything NATO stands for.”
Beyond the summit lies an even more consequential potential development. According to insiders, the Pentagon is conducting a review of U.S. troop deployments worldwide. A preliminary draft suggests the administration may announce a drawdown of American forces stationed in Europe.
If confirmed, the move could trigger anxiety among NATO’s eastern members and embolden Russia.
“A pullback now would send the wrong signal,” said a NATO military planner. “It would suggest we’re scaling down just as Russia is scaling up.”
Some European capitals are already preparing contingency plans, including increasing bilateral defense spending and launching new regional security initiatives outside of NATO.
As leaders descend on The Hague, NATO finds itself at a crossroads. Russia’s continued aggression, Ukraine’s uncertain future, and a brewing East-West divide within the alliance present existential questions. But the wildcard, once again, is the United States under Donald Trump.
Will the alliance emerge from the summit stronger and more unified—or fractured and directionless?
Much depends on whether NATO can reconcile Trump’s unpredictable views with the consensus of its other 31 members. As one senior European diplomat put it: “If we can just get Trump to call Russia a long-term threat and not upend the summit, that would be a win.”
