New revelations surrounding Ukraine’s unprecedented covert drone strikes on multiple Russian air bases have captured global attention, fueling renewed scrutiny over the vulnerability of military infrastructure in a world increasingly shaped by low-cost, high-impact aerial threats. While the exact scale of damage remains unclear, Ukrainian officials claim that their campaign—conducted using 117 small first-person-view (FPV) kamikaze drones—struck five separate bases and damaged or destroyed as many as 41 Russian aircraft. These claims remain unverified but have triggered waves of analysis, speculation, and debate about how nations, particularly the United States, are preparing for similar threats.
The attacks reportedly targeted Russian strategic bombers that have played a key role in long-range cruise missile strikes against Ukraine. According to Andriy Kovalenko of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, at least 13 aircraft were fully destroyed, though these numbers are still speculative.
What sets these strikes apart is their operational ingenuity. Ukrainian forces used truck-mounted, shed-like launch containers to house and deploy the drones. Though technical details remain under wraps, some drones were reportedly controlled using FPV goggles or tablet devices, indicating a hybrid mix of autonomous and human-in-the-loop guidance. Satellite imagery confirms that many of the Russian bombers were parked in the open, rendering them especially vulnerable.
This is not a new vulnerability. As early as 2017, U.S. Air Force Gen. James “Mike” Holmes warned that even a few commercial drones could jeopardize the integrity of advanced aircraft like the F-22. His warnings, once dismissed as theoretical, now feel prophetic.
Russia has previously faced drone attacks at Khmeimim Air Base in Syria in 2017, which became a catalyst for the construction of hardened aircraft shelters there. In response to more recent Ukrainian strikes, Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov has confirmed that protective shelters are being built across Russian airfields, with satellite images corroborating such developments since late 2023.
Interestingly, a model hangar containing a Tu-160 Blackjack bomber was displayed to Belousov recently. Although it’s unclear whether the hangar is a real or conceptual project, its presence signals Moscow’s growing interest in fortifying its strategic aviation assets.
Russia is not alone in rethinking airbase defense. Similar trends have emerged in China, North Korea, and other states aiming to protect key assets from aerial incursions. The United States, however, lags in this area. While some hardened aircraft shelters exist, investments in such infrastructure have been minimal since the Cold War.
The U.S. military has prioritized active defenses—such as surface-to-air missile systems—over passive measures like reinforced hangars. General Kevin Schneider of Pacific Air Forces recently acknowledged the strategic importance of dispersal and redundancy, noting the trade-offs between funding hardened shelters and restoring or maintaining multiple airfields across the Indo-Pacific region.
The recent deployment of six B-2 stealth bombers to Diego Garcia, where only four non-hardened shelters exist, has reignited the debate over U.S. vulnerability. During this mission, aircraft were parked in the open, raising alarm among defense analysts and lawmakers.
In May 2024, 13 Republican members of Congress sent an open letter to U.S. military leadership urging significant investment in passive defenses, including hardened aircraft shelters, underground bunkers, and runway repair capabilities. The letter emphasized that while shelters can’t stop all missile threats, they substantially increase the difficulty for adversaries attempting to neutralize U.S. airpower.
A January 2025 Hudson Institute report supports this view. The think tank concluded that as few as 10 cluster-munition-equipped missiles could disable critical airfields like Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni or Langley Air Force Base. These findings have amplified calls for a major reevaluation of base protection strategies.
The Ukrainian operation leveraged ArduPilot, an open-source autopilot system, showcasing how accessible and cost-effective modern drone warfare can be. The implications are chilling: with minimal investment, non-state actors or peer adversaries could inflict significant strategic damage.
Worse still, advances in AI and autonomy are lowering the barrier to effective drone deployment. Drones that do not require active links to human operators are harder to detect and immune to jamming. They can navigate complex environments and target dynamic assets without relying on GPS, which can be spoofed or disrupted.
Swarming behavior—drones operating in coordinated groups—adds another dimension to the threat. These swarms can overwhelm defenses, respond in real time to changing battle conditions, and saturate even the most robust active protection systems.
Rear Adm. Paul Spedero, vice director for operations at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently told Congress that defense technology has not kept pace with offensive drone capabilities. Fully autonomous systems, capable of independent navigation and targeting, present a seismic shift in the balance of power.
The U.S. homeland is not immune. Langley Air Force Base in Virginia experienced mysterious drone incursions in December 2023, drawing congressional attention. Base officials at Langley and Seymour Johnson in North Carolina have floated ideas like physical nets over open shelters, though progress on such initiatives remains unclear.
Legal and regulatory constraints also hamper domestic counter-drone efforts. At Falcon Peak 2025, a military counter-drone exercise held in October 2024, it became evident that kinetic countermeasures like lasers, microwaves, and missiles remain restricted for use within U.S. borders.
The Department of Defense is pushing for expanded authorities to protect domestic bases, but current laws lag behind operational needs. U.S. Northern Command has been tasked with synchronizing these efforts under a new Pentagon-wide counter-drone strategy, but the rollout has been slow and bureaucratic.
Ukraine’s ability to strike deep into Russian territory with commercial-grade drones underscores a broader, disquieting reality: drone threats are not limited by geography. Drones can be launched from thousands of miles away or from a nearby rooftop. Their platforms are equally diverse—land-based units, sea vessels, and even other drones can serve as launchpads.
The concept of “layered” drone attacks, involving multiple classes of drones attacking from various vectors simultaneously, presents a nightmare scenario for defenders. Each drone may not pose a high individual threat, but their cumulative effect can be devastating.
This tactic mimics natural swarms and allows attackers to penetrate air defenses by sheer volume and maneuverability. Defenders, constrained by finite missile inventories and slow reaction times, are at a distinct disadvantage.
In light of Ukraine’s operations and broader technological trends, defense analysts are urging a comprehensive reassessment of how airbases are protected. Passive measures like hardened shelters, if not universally applicable, can still meaningfully increase the survival rates of critical assets.
Moreover, a robust counter-drone ecosystem needs to be developed—not just for deployed forces, but also for domestic facilities. That includes legal reforms, better integration of federal and military authorities, and a clearer doctrine on what constitutes a legitimate aerial threat.
There’s also a need for increased R&D spending on non-kinetic defenses: electromagnetic pulse systems, directed energy weapons, and AI-driven jamming and tracking solutions.
Ukraine’s covert drone offensive against Russian air bases has done more than inflict tactical damage. It has served as a wake-up call to the rest of the world, especially the United States. Military planners can no longer treat uncrewed aerial systems as a niche threat. They are now a central feature of modern conflict—a low-cost, high-impact vector capable of reshaping strategic balances.
If the U.S. continues to delay investment in base fortifications, counter-drone systems, and flexible force postures, it risks exposing its most advanced assets to what could be described as preventable vulnerabilities. The drone age is not on the horizon—it has arrived.
