On April 21, 2025, a curious pattern emerged in the skies over western Ukraine. According to open-source flight tracking data from Flightradar24, an aircraft was seen circling at an altitude of roughly 3,000 meters above Lviv, a strategic city near Ukraine’s border with Poland. Local residents reported hearing the loud hum of propeller engines, an unusual sound in an airspace usually dominated by jets or drones.
Though officially unconfirmed, speculation surged that the aircraft was one of the Swedish ASC 890 AEW&C planes—Airborne Early Warning and Control systems—recently pledged to Ukraine. This flight marks the possible first deployment of such an aircraft in Ukrainian-controlled airspace, a development with wide-ranging strategic implications.
In May 2024, Sweden announced a military aid package to Ukraine worth $1.2 billion (13.3 billion SEK). Among the assets promised were two ASC 890 AEW&C aircraft based on the Saab 340 platform. These aircraft are equipped with the Erieye radar, a side-looking, active electronically scanned array (AESA) system capable of 360-degree coverage and detection ranges of up to 450 kilometers under optimal conditions.
Only 12 of these planes were ever built, with production ending in 1999. The two designated for Ukraine likely underwent refurbishment to modernize their systems and integrate with NATO-standard communication protocols such as Link 16—a secure data link that allows real-time information sharing between air, land, and naval assets.
Unlike large, jet-powered AEW&C aircraft like the U.S. E-3 Sentry, the ASC 890 is a more compact and agile tool, designed for regional surveillance and battlefield control rather than strategic oversight. Yet, for Ukraine, this compact package could pack a disproportionate punch.
For over two years, NATO and U.S. AWACS aircraft like the E-3 Sentry have conducted round-the-clock surveillance of Ukraine’s airspace—from just outside it. Operating from bases in Poland, Romania, and other NATO member states, these aircraft offer valuable data on Russian missile launches, drone movements, and fighter deployments.
The E-3, equipped with the AN/APY-1/2 radar, boasts coverage ranges that can reach 800 kilometers under ideal conditions. Its altitude and persistence—12+ hours airborne with refueling—make it a central pillar in NATO’s eyes-on strategy. However, political constraints keep these aircraft outside Ukraine’s borders, limiting their responsiveness and forcing Ukraine to rely on secondhand data.
That’s what makes the ASC 890 so crucial: it can fly inside Ukraine’s airspace. This geographic proximity means data on Russian aircraft, drones, and missile activity can be fed into Ukraine’s air defense network in near real time. It also means faster target acquisition, shorter kill chains, and quicker decision-making—potentially the difference between interception and impact.
However, that proximity also comes with a steep cost: vulnerability. Unlike NATO aircraft shielded by the buffer of friendly airspace and the protection of U.S. fighters, the ASC 890 would be operating in a contested environment. Its subsonic speed, limited maneuverability, and relatively small radar signature make it a prime target for Russian long-range air-to-air missiles such as the R-37M, which can reach targets up to 300 kilometers away.
The R-37M has been credited with multiple kills during the war, often fired from MiG-31BM interceptors or Su-35S multirole fighters operating in Russian-held airspace. With high speeds and semi-active homing capability, the R-37M can overwhelm or bypass conventional countermeasures—especially if the ASC 890 flies without dedicated escort.
Furthermore, Russia’s deployment of advanced electronic warfare systems like the Krasukha-4 poses another threat. Designed to jam and degrade radar and communication systems, the Krasukha can potentially reduce the effectiveness of the ASC 890’s Erieye radar. While modern AESA systems are more resistant to jamming, degradation is inevitable, especially close to the front.
Despite these challenges, the introduction of the ASC 890 could dramatically enhance Ukraine’s air power, especially when paired with its incoming fleet of Western fighter jets.
Ukraine is set to receive dozens of F-16 fighters from several NATO member states, alongside a handful of Mirage 2000 aircraft from France. These platforms, while decades old, are formidable when linked with early warning and data sharing systems like Link 16.
Currently, Ukrainian fighters operate with limited airborne radar support, relying instead on ground-based radar systems, visual confirmation, or externally provided data. The ASC 890 changes that equation by allowing fighters to maintain radar silence while receiving a real-time aerial picture from a distant, high-flying surveillance platform.
This “silent hunter” mode is essential in an environment saturated with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and electronic warfare. A Ukrainian F-16 equipped with AIM-120C7 missiles (range ~120 km), cued by data from an ASC 890, could engage a Russian Su-35 without ever turning on its own radar.
The same applies to the Mirage 2000s, which carry MICA-EM and MICA-IR missiles. In the future, Ukraine may also receive the next-generation MICA-NG, which offers enhanced range (~110 km), better end-game agility, and improved resistance to jamming—making it a perfect companion for Erieye-based targeting.
So far, Ukraine has struggled to establish meaningful control over its own airspace. Russian fighters like the Su-30SM and Su-35S dominate the skies over occupied territories, providing cover to bombers like the Su-34, which drop glide bombs from relative safety beyond the range of Ukrainian air defenses.
This dynamic has enabled Russia to carry out daily airstrikes on Ukrainian positions with relative impunity, even in contested regions like Donetsk and Kharkiv.
With airborne early warning and command from the ASC 890, that could change. Ukrainian fighters would have a fighting chance to intercept those bombers before release, or better yet, deny them airspace altogether.
In essence, the ASC 890 allows Ukraine to impose a kind of “no-fly zone” over parts of its own territory—not by political declaration, but by force projection.
There’s another layer of urgency driving Ukraine’s push to operate its own AEW&C platforms: political uncertainty. With signs of wavering U.S. support amid election-year politics, and increasing debate within NATO about the sustainability of military aid, Ukraine cannot afford to bet its air war on foreign surveillance forever.
The ASC 890 offers a fallback—an indigenous, Ukrainian-operated platform that cannot be withdrawn by allied governments or subject to sudden shifts in foreign policy. It also allows for tighter operational security, since mission data remains within Ukrainian command structures.
But it’s more than a contingency plan. If Ukraine can successfully integrate the ASC 890 into its wider air defense network, it could reshape the battlefield.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, the appearance of the ASC 890 over Ukraine represents an escalation—one with far-reaching consequences.
Unlike NATO-operated AWACS that avoid direct involvement, the ASC 890 is part of Ukraine’s military, inside its borders, and contributing directly to real-time targeting. That makes it a legitimate military target under the laws of war.
Yet attacking it could trigger a cascade of escalation. If Russia attempts to shoot down the aircraft with a MiG-31BM or an S-400 SAM system, and Ukraine responds by using U.S.-supplied Patriots to intercept those threats, it blurs the line between defensive and offensive engagements.
Worse, any Russian strike on an AEW&C aircraft operating near NATO borders—especially if it spills into adjacent airspace—risks drawing NATO aircraft into defensive postures. The air war over Ukraine, until now a shadow conflict of sensors and data streams, could take on a more kinetic character.
If the circling aircraft over Lviv on April 21 was indeed an ASC 890, its appearance marks a turning point. It signals that Ukraine is entering a new phase in the war—one where its air forces can match, and potentially challenge, Russia’s dominance in the sky.
This isn’t the final answer to Russia’s air power advantage, but it’s a step toward parity—and eventually, superiority.
For now, Ukrainian operators and Western trainers will be focused on integrating the ASC 890 into combat missions, refining doctrine, and ensuring that the system survives long enough to make a difference.
