More than three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war remains far from over. Since the return of Donald Trump to the White House in January 2025, diplomatic overtures have offered only fleeting hope of a ceasefire. Russia’s ambiguous and often contradictory signals regarding peace talks have left analysts grasping for clarity on President Vladimir Putin’s true intentions.
But a growing body of intelligence, expert assessments, and statements from senior Ukrainian officials point to a stark conclusion: Putin is not merely interested in the four Ukrainian oblasts that have dominated past negotiations. Instead, Moscow’s long-term objective may be to seize nearly half of Ukraine—essentially, everything east of the Dnipro River—and cut Kyiv off from the Black Sea.
This vision, if realized, would fundamentally alter Ukraine’s geography, economy, and sovereignty.
According to Colonel Pavlo Palisa, Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office, Russia’s operational goal is to fully seize Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025. By the end of that year, Moscow aims to create a “buffer zone” along Ukraine’s northern border with Russia.
During a briefing to a bipartisan group of U.S. senators on June 4, Palisa laid out chilling new intelligence. The Russian strategy reportedly extends into 2026 and envisions full occupation of Ukrainian territory east of the Dnipro River, along with the southern regions of Mykolaiv and Odessa. If successful, this would landlock Ukraine, cutting it off from vital maritime trade and placing it at Moscow’s mercy for access to international waters.
A recently published map, shared with Western intelligence agencies and now circulating among media outlets, visualizes these territorial ambitions. It depicts Russia’s aim to hold a total of 336,300 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory by the end of 2026—over 55% of the country’s pre-war landmass.
The Dnipro River is not just a geographic boundary—it’s a symbol, a strategic bulwark, and an economic artery.
For Russian military planners and nationalists, controlling the east bank of the Dnipro offers several benefits:
- Natural Defense Line: The Dnipro is one of the few natural geographic barriers in Eastern Europe. Russia, with its extensive and flat borders, has long feared invasion. Establishing defensive fortifications along the Dnipro’s eastern bank would provide a rare and substantial buffer.
- Crimea Corridor: Holding Kherson and Zaporizhia secures land access to Crimea and ensures a stable water supply via the North Crimean Canal, which Ukraine had previously blocked following Russia’s 2014 annexation of the peninsula.
- Economic Leverage: The Dnipro River supports Ukraine’s agriculture, energy production, and trade. Dominating the eastern bank would impair Ukraine’s internal logistics, economic productivity, and global exports.
- Historical and Ideological Claim: Putin frequently invokes the concept of “Novorossiya” (New Russia), a Tsarist-era vision of a Russia-dominated southern and eastern Ukraine. The Dnipro River played a central role in the medieval Kievan Rus, which both modern Russia and Ukraine claim as a foundational state.
In Putin’s mind, seizing these lands is a step toward both strategic dominance and historical redemption.
Despite the ambition, analysts argue that Russia’s military may not be up to the task. A recent analysis by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) casts serious doubt on Russia’s ability to achieve its goals within the projected time frame.
The slow pace of Russian advances—just 30 to 50 kilometers gained over the past 15 months near Avdiivka—suggests that sweeping through entire oblasts in months is unrealistic.
To reach the Dnipro, Russian forces must capture heavily fortified cities like Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Kostyantynivka. These urban battles will likely mirror the costly siege of Bakhmut, which drained Russian manpower and resources.
Further complicating matters, Russian troops may need to launch simultaneous offensives in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv to achieve their northern goals. Such a wide front would stretch Russian logistics and personnel, already under strain.
Palisa’s briefing and accompanying map suggested that Russia also intends to capture oblast capitals like Kharkiv, Dnipro, Poltava, Mykolaiv, and Odessa—cities with a combined pre-war population exceeding 5.6 million. These are not mere military targets; they are complex urban centers that would require extensive and sustained assaults.
Russia has not successfully captured an oblast capital since taking Kherson in March 2022, a city it subsequently lost in November of the same year. The idea that it can now capture nine is a stretch, even under optimal conditions.
Central to Putin’s calculations is the assumption that Western support for Ukraine will eventually wane.
“Russia’s only real hope of winning its war in Ukraine is to convince the West to abandon Ukraine,” the ISW notes.
Indeed, the war’s continuation hinges on the resilience of Western political will. With the U.S. presidential election resulting in Trump’s return, questions loom about the continuity of American aid. Trump has repeatedly expressed skepticism about NATO and U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts.
But so far, bipartisan elements in Congress have continued to authorize aid packages. In Europe, countries like Germany, Poland, and the UK remain staunch supporters of Ukraine, although internal political shifts—like far-right gains in France and economic strain across the EU—could gradually erode this unity.
If Western support falters, Ukraine’s ability to resist Russia’s broader territorial ambitions could collapse rapidly.
One of the most alarming components of Russia’s reported strategy is the planned seizure of the Mykolaiv and Odessa oblasts. These coastal regions are Ukraine’s gateway to the Black Sea and, by extension, to global trade.
Odessa, in particular, is vital—not just for grain exports, but also as a symbol of Ukraine’s historic and multicultural identity. The loss of Odessa would not only decimate Ukraine’s economy but psychologically shatter its claim to European modernity.
By landlocking Ukraine, Russia could effectively force Kyiv to rely on Russian ports or overland routes through hostile or unstable territory. This would make Ukraine permanently dependent on Moscow—a geopolitical masterstroke for Putin.
Recent talks in Istanbul have generated media attention but little substantive progress. Russian negotiators continue to insist on the formal recognition of the annexed territories and a neutral, non-NATO-aligned Ukraine.
Kyiv, for its part, maintains that no territorial concessions are acceptable.
These irreconcilable positions have turned the ceasefire talks into a geopolitical theater—a forum to sway international opinion rather than forge genuine peace.
Senior Ukrainian officials privately warn that these negotiations may be part of Russia’s broader deception strategy. While talking peace, Moscow is regrouping, resupplying, and rearming for the next phase of its war effort.
As of mid-2025, the Ukrainian battlefield remains fluid but deadly. Russia’s strategy has shifted from blitzkrieg to attrition, banking on Western fatigue and internal Ukrainian exhaustion.
Yet Ukraine, hardened by years of war and backed by Western weapons and training, remains resilient. Ukrainian society has transformed under fire, with national identity stronger than ever and civil society fully mobilized.
Putin’s endgame may be to grind Ukraine into submission, but time may not be on his side. The Russian economy, although partially shielded by energy revenues and trade with non-Western allies, is under long-term strain. Sanctions, brain drain, and the costs of sustaining a 1,000-kilometer frontline are eroding Russia’s ability to wage prolonged warfare.
What Putin ultimately hopes to achieve is not merely territorial conquest but geopolitical transformation. He seeks to rewrite the post-Cold War order, reassert Russian dominance in Eastern Europe, and destroy Ukraine’s Western aspirations.
But this ambition carries enormous risks. A failed offensive could provoke internal dissent in Russia. Prolonged war may destabilize neighboring regions. And most importantly, the dream of a landlocked, conquered Ukraine may prove militarily impossible without a collapse in Western support.
Whether the war continues into 2026—and how it evolves—will depend not only on Russian and Ukrainian resolve but also on the decisions made in Washington, Brussels, and beyond.
