As Americans prepare to vote in the November 5th presidential election, analysts are forecasting a tough path ahead for Sino-US relations, regardless of whether Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump wins the Oval Office. Though each candidate’s policies vary in approach, a broad bipartisan consensus on countering China is expected to persist. This stance is shaping Washington’s strategic approach toward Beijing, a reality that Chinese leaders fully recognize and are preparing to address.
“Strategic patience is Beijing’s only choice in dealing with Washington, regardless of whether it’s Trump or Harris,” noted Einar Tangen, a senior fellow at Beijing’s Taihe Institute. As experts highlight, three core issues—trade, technology, and Taiwan—stand at the center of this complex bilateral relationship, with global repercussions that could shift based on how each issue is navigated.
For several years, competition and confrontation have overshadowed cooperation in US-China relations. Analysts see this dynamic as now deeply embedded within the structure of their relationship. The recent lapse of the 45-year-old Sino-US scientific cooperation treaty in August marks a clear signal of this cooling, with both sides escalating their stance on a growing list of disagreements centered on national security.
Elections, however, often stir uncertainty. Steven Okun, senior advisor at APAC Advisors, noted that while campaign rhetoric may intensify, China policy is likely to remain consistent regardless of who holds office. “US-China policy will be the same under either a Harris or Trump administration. There will be more tariffs and more investment restrictions,” he observed.
Both candidates have already laid out their China stances. Harris has promised a strategy that keeps the US competitive against China in global innovation and economic dominance, while Trump, who launched a trade war with China during his first term, has vowed to sever economic dependence on Beijing altogether. “To me, the most beautiful word in the dictionary is ‘tariffs,’” Trump said recently, vowing to expand tariffs on Chinese imports significantly should he return to the White House.
A second Trump administration would likely bring a continuation—and potential intensification—of tariffs and trade restrictions. As tariffs have been a cornerstone of Trump’s economic policy, a blanket tariff rate of 10 to 20 percent on all imports, with rates for Chinese goods potentially rising above 60 percent, has been suggested. While many of Trump’s tariff policies were maintained by the Biden administration, analysts expect Harris, if elected, to retain some of these measures. She would likely emphasize cooperation with allies and a steady military posture as part of a broader security framework aimed at limiting China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
The “small yard, high fence” strategy introduced under Biden, which restricts China’s access to critical US technologies, is anticipated to continue under either administration. Recently tightened controls, including a ban on American firms investing in sensitive Chinese technologies like AI and quantum computing, exemplify this approach. While China has called for greater transparency regarding these boundaries, William Choong, a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, suggests that Beijing has reluctantly accepted this reality. “The Chinese are saying: ‘We don’t care if it’s going to be a small yard or big yard. Just tell us what the boundaries of the yard actually are,’” he noted.
Tensions around Taiwan have escalated to unprecedented levels, making it a central issue in US-China relations. China considers Taiwan an inseparable part of its territory and has signaled it will not tolerate efforts toward Taiwan independence. President Xi Jinping has called Taiwan “the first red line” in the Sino-US relationship. The US has maintained a “strategic ambiguity” policy—intentionally leaving it unclear how it would respond to a Chinese military attempt to reclaim the island. While this approach has provided a space for diplomatic negotiation, recent military maneuvers by China signal a potential for increased confrontation.
Harris, if elected, is expected to reinforce alliances to contain China’s growing influence, particularly in Asia. This would likely lead to continued irritation in Beijing, which views American alliances as part of a containment strategy. On the other hand, Trump’s approach to Taiwan remains a wildcard. His inconsistent statements on Taiwan’s value to the US and accusations that Taiwan is siphoning off US semiconductor business raise questions about his commitment to Taiwan’s defense.
Security policy could be shaped significantly by the next administration’s personnel choices. Okun points out that the Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, and US Trade Representative hold influential positions in shaping China policy. Current Secretary of State Antony Blinken, for example, has led several engagements with Chinese leaders, emphasizing a guarded but open dialogue. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has also engaged with Beijing on economic issues, underlining areas of mutual interest amid a fraught relationship.
Trump has already indicated that his cabinet appointees, if he were re-elected, would be chosen for their loyalty to his vision, suggesting a more hawkish stance on China. Conversely, Harris is expected to prioritize a younger, more diverse team, balancing continuity with fresh perspectives.
For China, the potential implications of a Trump or Harris victory are starkly different. Analysts believe a second Trump term could pose a unique challenge. Without the constraints of re-election, Trump might feel empowered to adopt an even more confrontational stance. Dr. Chen Dongxiao, president of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, points out that Trump’s policies would likely mobilize federal agencies to push his aggressive containment agenda.
Observers note that while Beijing may have a preference, it avoids expressing any overt opinion on the US election, mindful of accusations of interference. “They don’t have a vote. They do have a preference,” Dr. Choong said, “But when they don’t get their preference, they have to work with whoever occupies the Oval Office.”
Some analysts suggest that a Harris victory could be seen as preferable for Beijing, given the likelihood of a smoother policy transition and greater continuity. Prof. Jia Qingguo, a former dean at Peking University, contends that a change in the party of leadership often brings heightened tensions due to campaign promises that position the incumbent as “soft” on China. These pledges can, however unrealistic, create turbulence as the new administration seeks to fulfill them.
Furthermore, the complexity of the US presidential transition process can exacerbate tensions. This formal handover period may leave key understandings about Sino-US policy unresolved or under-communicated, potentially leading to misunderstandings and diplomatic frictions.
Experts widely agree that despite differing methods, both Trump and Harris would likely lead the US toward similar confrontational policies with China. “It’s two roads to the same cliff,” remarked Tangen, capturing the view that regardless of the White House’s occupant, the core issues between the US and China will endure. Analysts point to the steady flow of US-China challenges as a sign of fundamental ideological differences and geopolitical positioning that neither candidate can simply reverse.
From a strategic perspective, some posit that both countries may need to find a form of mutual cooperation. Tangen invoked the Prisoner’s Dilemma—a scenario where two parties can achieve the best outcome by cooperating rather than competing in isolation. “China and the US … as the leading economies, have a duty to learn and accept their differences and work towards a shared future,” he stated.
