In a setback to India’s growing ambitions for defence self-reliance, efforts to equip the forthcoming Rafale M carrier-borne fighters with the indigenous Uttam Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar have reportedly hit a roadblock. Sources close to the Indian defence establishment confirm that Dassault Aviation, the French aerospace firm behind the Rafale platform, has firmly refused integration of the Uttam radar with the naval variant it is set to deliver to the Indian Navy.
The development is a blow not just to India’s $5 billion fighter acquisition programme but also to its broader ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ initiative, aimed at reducing dependence on foreign-origin defence systems. The confrontation between Indian aspirations and foreign OEM (original equipment manufacturer) resistance reveals the limits of strategic autonomy in high-stakes military aviation procurement.
At the core of this stalemate lies India’s desire to enhance sovereign control over its defence platforms by integrating locally developed subsystems—most crucially, radars and electronic warfare suites. However, Dassault Aviation’s opposition is rooted in a doctrine of platform integrity, wherein the aircraft’s source code and sensor integration architecture remain tightly controlled by the manufacturer to maintain operational reliability, NATO standards, and intellectual property protection.
Dassault has insisted that the RBE2 radar, a battle-proven AESA unit developed by Thales, must remain the central sensor on all Rafale variants. It is a key component not just of targeting, but of network-centric warfare capability, fusing inputs from the SPECTRA EW suite, laser and IR sensors, and secure tactical data links.
Industry sources report that any move to replace RBE2 with the Uttam radar would trigger technical, financial, and regulatory complications, potentially delaying delivery timelines and voiding performance guarantees.
This is not the first time India has clashed with France over system integration rights. New Delhi has long sought access to Rafale’s source code—the underlying digital architecture that governs weapon integration, radar inputs, and mission configurations. Access would enable India to deploy indigenous air-to-air missiles, electronic warfare modules, and surveillance payloads.
Despite several high-level diplomatic overtures, Dassault has consistently refused to part with the source code, citing security risks, interoperability concerns, and IP restrictions. Without it, the Indian Navy remains dependent on France for software upgrades, future weapon integration, and mission customization.
The inability to incorporate the Uttam radar only compounds this dependence.
Developed by DRDO’s Electronics and Radar Development Establishment (LRDE), the Uttam AESA radar is a cornerstone of India’s indigenous combat aviation capability. It features:
- Detection range of over 150 km for fighter-sized targets.
- Simultaneous tracking of multiple airborne threats.
- Robust ECCM (Electronic Counter-Countermeasures) for operation in contested electromagnetic environments.
Modular architecture, allowing for adaptation across platforms like the Tejas Mk1A, Tejas Mk2, AMCA, UCAVs, and potentially naval aircraft.
Uttam is seen as India’s answer to foreign AESA systems like Israel’s EL/M-2052, Russia’s Zhuk-AE, and Sweden’s Raven ES-05. With over 80 Tejas Mk1A jets expected to carry Uttam by 2025, the radar is fast becoming the spine of India’s indigenous aerial combat ecosystem.
Integration into the Rafale M would have given it an international showcase platform, possibly unlocking export opportunities in Southeast Asia and Africa.
The Rafale M was chosen specifically for carrier operations aboard INS Vikrant, India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier. As the MiG-29K continues to underperform with issues related to serviceability, radar reliability, and flight control software, the Navy has been desperate for a high-performance replacement.
The Rafale M deal, signed in 2023:
- 26 carrier-borne fighters (22 single-seat and 4 twin-seat trainers)
- Meteor BVR air-to-air missiles
- SCALP cruise missiles
- Exocet AM39 anti-ship missiles
- Ancillary maintenance and support packages
The Rafale M’s carrier-specific reinforcements, like its tailhook system and rugged undercarriage for ski-jump launches, make it an ideal fit for Indian carrier operations. The fighters will likely become fully operational by 2028, forming the aerial backbone of India’s Carrier Battle Group (CBG) in the Indian Ocean Region.
But with Uttam radar excluded, the aircraft will fly with an all-French suite—radar, EW systems, and even mission computers—essentially undermining India’s objective of tech independence.
This technological dependence comes at a time of rising maritime contestation. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has expanded its operations in the Indian Ocean, frequently deploying Shandong and Liaoning aircraft carriers beyond the South China Sea.
India, meanwhile, is seeking to position itself as a credible counterbalance in the Indo-Pacific by modernizing both its air and naval strike capability.
Analysts warn that over-reliance on foreign-origin systems in such a tense regional theatre is a vulnerability, especially during crisis scenarios where external supply chains might be disrupted due to geopolitical considerations.
Without domestic radar integration, India will have limited agility to reconfigure its platforms based on real-time operational needs—a disadvantage in multi-domain warfare that increasingly demands sensor fusion, cyber resilience, and tactical autonomy.
From Dassault’s perspective, the refusal to integrate Uttam AESA isn’t just about intellectual property or risk mitigation. There are strategic business interests at play.
- Preserving platform uniformity across export customers ensures easier logistics and upgrade packages.
- Retaining software and radar integration control guarantees recurring revenue through mid-life upgrades, spares, and system refreshes.
- Preventing third-party radars maintains Dassault’s competitive edge in the AESA domain, where France’s RBE2 radar has a proven reputation.
Permitting a foreign-developed radar—even from a buyer like India—could open the floodgates to reverse engineering, competitor insights, and integration practices that other potential clients may demand.
Under Indian defence procurement rules, at least 50% of the Rafale M deal’s value must be invested back into the Indian ecosystem via offsets. While the radar integration has been vetoed, Dassault and Thales are expected to:
- Establish local training and MRO (Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul) facilities.
- Partner with Indian firms like HAL and BEL for component manufacturing.
- Support the creation of spare parts hubs for faster operational turnaround.
- Such offsets, while commercially beneficial, fall short of the strategic tech transfer India was hoping for through radar and software integration rights.
Despite the Rafale M setback, Uttam AESA’s trajectory remains upward. DRDO has multiple versions in the pipeline:
- Miniaturized AESA for drones and rotary-wing platforms.
- Maritime surveillance variants for coast guard and naval P-8I-style aircraft.
- Advanced radars with GaN (Gallium Nitride) technology, offering higher power efficiency and resilience.
The Indian Air Force is also reportedly considering Uttam derivatives for future fighters under the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme—a fifth-generation stealth platform currently in development.
By building domestic radar mastery, India aims to ensure interoperability between airborne platforms, ground-based sensors, and naval assets, effectively creating an integrated theatre command network.
India’s experience with the Rafale M underscores the trade-offs of importing frontline combat aircraft. Even the most advanced fighters come with restrictions on modification, upgrades, and system replacement, unless explicitly negotiated upfront.
India may need to consider the following going forward:
- Negotiate deeper tech transfer and source code access in future foreign deals—possibly through bilateral defence treaties or strategic partnerships.
- Accelerate indigenous fighter programmes like the Tejas Mk2 and AMCA, which offer full freedom over radar, weapons, and EW integration.
- Diversify procurement, engaging with vendors from multiple countries (e.g., Russia, Israel, Sweden) to avoid being locked into any one ecosystem.
- Invest in private-sector defence R&D, fostering startups and joint ventures in high-tech defence electronics.
The Uttam AESA radar remains a potent symbol of India’s scientific and strategic progress. It represents a maturing defence-industrial base, capable of producing world-class systems once thought to be the sole domain of foreign players.
Yet the failure to embed Uttam in the Rafale M is a sobering reminder that global defence procurement is as much about geopolitics and intellectual property as it is about engineering.
