When Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on May 12 that Russia had successfully tested the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), he described it as the most powerful missile ever built — capable of striking any point on Earth, evading all current and future Western missile defenses, and carrying payloads far larger than those of American missiles.
Putin claimed that the Sarmat, known in the West as “Satan II,” possesses a range exceeding 35,000 kilometers and can deliver devastating nuclear payloads through multiple independently targetable warheads. He further stated that the missile would enter combat service by the end of this year.
The announcement immediately revived a crucial strategic question: Is Russia genuinely close to obtaining a decisive technological edge over the United States in the field of nuclear missiles?
The issue is especially significant because the US ground-based Minuteman III ICBMs are aging rapidly, while their replacement under the Sentinel program continues to face delays and cost overruns. At a time when global tensions are already elevated due to multiple wars and increasing geopolitical rivalry, the deployment of a next-generation Russian heavy ICBM could potentially reshape the strategic balance between Moscow and Washington.
Yet despite Putin’s dramatic claims, many defense analysts remain skeptical. Questions persist regarding the missile’s actual capabilities, survivability, reliability, and readiness for operational deployment.
The RS-28 Sarmat was designed to replace the Soviet-era R-36M2 Voevoda, known in NATO terminology as the SS-18 Satan. Development of the missile reportedly began during the 2000s as Russia sought to modernize its strategic nuclear arsenal.
In 2011, production contracts were awarded to the Makeyev Design Bureau and NPOMash, while the first prototype was completed in late 2015.
The Sarmat is a massive, three-stage, liquid-fueled ICBM weighing approximately 208 metric tons. According to missile defense assessments, the missile measures around 35 meters in length and three meters in diameter, making it one of the heaviest ballistic missiles ever built.
Russian officials classify it as a “heavy” ICBM because of its extraordinary payload capacity. The missile can reportedly carry up to 10 large nuclear warheads, 16 smaller warheads, combinations of decoys and countermeasures, or even hypersonic glide vehicles such as the Avangard system.
Its payload is estimated at around 10 tonnes, significantly heavier than most Western missiles.
Officially, the missile’s minimum range is around 5,500 kilometers. Putin, however, claimed that the missile can travel over 35,000 kilometers — a figure that many Western analysts regard as exaggerated.
Most independent defense experts estimate the missile’s practical range to be around 18,000 kilometers, which is still more than sufficient to strike any target in the continental United States from deep inside Russian territory.
One of Putin’s strongest claims is that the RS-28 Sarmat can penetrate “all existing and future missile defense systems.”
This assertion is partly rooted in the missile’s design philosophy.
The Sarmat reportedly features a shorter boost phase — the initial period immediately after launch during which a ballistic missile’s engines produce intense heat and infrared signatures. During this phase, missiles are most vulnerable to detection and interception by space-based tracking systems.
By shortening the boost phase, Russia hopes to reduce the reaction time available to US early-warning satellites and missile defense systems.
In theory, this complicates interception efforts. However, Western analysts argue that no ballistic missile launch can remain invisible to modern space-based infrared detection systems.
Even a shorter boost phase still generates substantial thermal signatures detectable by advanced surveillance satellites.
Moreover, the United States is currently developing its ambitious “Golden Dome” missile defense architecture, which envisions large constellations of space-based sensors and interceptors capable of tracking and destroying ballistic missiles during multiple phases of flight.
According to estimates discussed in US defense planning circles, the system could eventually include thousands of space-based interceptors specifically intended to target missiles during their vulnerable boost phase.
If such systems become operational, the survivability advantage claimed for the Sarmat could be significantly reduced.
Despite Russia’s claims of technological superiority, the Sarmat program has suffered repeated delays and technical problems.
The missile was initially expected to enter service in 2018, with Russia reportedly planning to deploy around 50 units. However, the timeline slipped repeatedly due to testing complications and engineering difficulties.
The first silo ejection test conducted in December 2017 reportedly exposed technical problems within the launch system. Additional tests in March and May 2018 were more successful, but the missile still failed to achieve operational readiness.
The biggest setback came in September 2024, when a Sarmat test launch reportedly ended in catastrophe after the missile exploded inside its launch silo.
That failure raised serious doubts regarding the missile’s propulsion reliability and structural integrity.
Research published by the UK-based think tank Royal United Services Institute suggested that the missile may be suffering from propulsion-related complications linked to its advanced design and reduced-weight structure.
Liquid-fueled missiles are inherently more complex than solid-fuel systems because they require extensive fueling operations and involve sophisticated engine technologies. While they offer larger payload capacities and potentially greater flexibility, they are also more difficult to maintain and more vulnerable to technical malfunctions.
The Sarmat’s shortened boost phase may have further increased engineering challenges, especially regarding propulsion stability and launch reliability.
Putin has repeatedly promised that the Sarmat would enter operational service “by the end of the year” since at least 2021. Russian opposition publication Astra reportedly documented roughly ten such statements over the past several years, with each projected deployment date eventually postponed.
This history of delays is one reason many analysts doubt Russia’s latest timeline.
Historically, Soviet and Russian heavy nuclear missiles underwent extensive testing before entering active service. The predecessor missile, the R-36M2 Voevoda, reportedly completed around 20 successful test launches before being fully operational.
By contrast, the Sarmat program has experienced a much smaller and more troubled testing cycle.
For a strategic nuclear weapon intended to serve as the backbone of Russia’s deterrent, reliability is absolutely critical. A missile with unresolved propulsion or launch issues cannot credibly fulfill its deterrence role.
As a result, many experts believe Russia will likely require several additional successful tests before the missile can be safely placed on combat alert status.
Even if the RS-28 Sarmat eventually becomes fully operational, it may not necessarily represent a revolutionary leap in strategic capability.
Its enormous size and liquid-fuel configuration create vulnerabilities absent in newer solid-fuel missile systems such as Russia’s RS-24 Yars.
Unlike mobile solid-fuel missiles, the Sarmat is silo-based, meaning its launch positions are fixed and potentially targetable during wartime. Liquid-fuel missiles also require longer launch preparation times and more demanding maintenance procedures.
Solid-fuel systems, while carrying lighter payloads, are generally quicker to launch, easier to operate, and more survivable under combat conditions.
This means the Sarmat’s impressive destructive potential comes with trade-offs in operational flexibility and survivability.
In practical terms, the RS-28 Sarmat appears designed less as a battlefield weapon and more as a strategic psychological instrument intended to reinforce Russia’s nuclear deterrence posture and project strength during periods of confrontation with the West.
The RS-28 Sarmat is undeniably a formidable missile on paper. Its payload capacity, range, and warhead flexibility make it one of the most powerful ICBMs ever conceived.
However, many of the broader claims surrounding the missile — particularly assertions that it can evade all missile defenses or decisively alter the nuclear balance — appear overstated.
The missile still faces unresolved technological hurdles, its operational readiness remains uncertain, and evolving American missile defense programs could gradually reduce many of its theoretical advantages.
Most importantly, nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States continues to rely not on a single missile system but on the broader balance of mutually assured destruction.
Even if the Sarmat enters service, it is unlikely to provide Russia with overwhelming strategic superiority over the West.
