On August 26, 2021, just eleven days after the Taliban swept into Kabul and reclaimed power in Afghanistan, a suicide bomber detonated explosives outside Abbey Gate at Hamid Karzai International Airport. The attack killed 13 U.S. service members and approximately 170 Afghan civilians attempting to flee the country during the chaotic evacuation effort.
The attacker, Abdul Rahman al-Logari, was a member of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the regional affiliate of the Islamic State. The bombing served as a stark reminder that the Taliban’s return to power had not ended Afghanistan’s terrorism problem. Instead, it had transformed it.
Nearly five years later, Afghanistan presents a complex security picture. The Taliban has succeeded in significantly reducing terrorist violence within the country’s borders and dismantling much of ISKP’s operational infrastructure. Yet the extremist group remains active, increasingly directing its attention beyond Afghanistan and emerging as a growing international threat.
Afghanistan’s post-2021 security environment has been shaped by more than the Taliban’s military victory. The movement inherited a country burdened by economic collapse, humanitarian crisis, social fragmentation, and porous borders that continue to facilitate the movement of militants, weapons, and narcotics.
Into this volatile environment stepped ISKP, which had already been operating in Afghanistan since January 2015.
The organization was formed by defectors from al-Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and factions of the Afghan Taliban. By 2021, estimates placed its strength between 1,500 and 2,200 fighters, concentrated largely in the eastern provinces of Kunar and Nangarhar.
Although both groups are Islamist movements, their ideological visions differ sharply. The Taliban combines religious governance with Afghan nationalism and focuses primarily on controlling Afghanistan. ISKP, by contrast, embraces the Islamic State’s transnational vision of a global Islamic caliphate. As a result, the two organizations view one another not merely as competitors but as existential enemies.
Before the Taliban’s return to power, ISKP had already established itself as one of the region’s deadliest terrorist organizations.
Between 2015 and 2024, the group was responsible for more than 2,000 civilian deaths, with attacks concentrated in Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. In the first six months of 2021 alone, United Nations monitors documented 20 attacks targeting Hazara-Shia civilians, resulting in approximately 500 casualties, including 143 deaths and 357 injuries.
The group’s tactics were particularly brutal. Suicide bombers targeted schools and mosques, gunmen attacked maternity wards, and militants ambushed religious pilgrims. By the time Kabul fell in August 2021, ISKP had recorded more than 340 attacks that year—more than double the number registered in any previous year since the group’s formation.
While ISKP’s presence inside Afghanistan has come under pressure, the organization has increasingly projected violence beyond the country’s borders.
In Pakistan, the group carried out at least 15 suicide attacks between 2016 and 2022, targeting both civilians and security forces. These operations killed more than 550 people and included devastating bombings during election rallies in July 2018 that left roughly 150 dead.
Following the Taliban takeover, ISKP demonstrated an increasing willingness to strike international targets. In 2022, militants attacked the Pakistani Embassy and the Russian Embassy in Kabul, as well as a hotel frequented by Chinese business travelers.
The group’s ambitions became even more evident in 2024.
In January, a double suicide bombing outside the tomb of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in Kerman, Iran, killed around 90 people and wounded more than 200 others. Just months later, on March 22, four gunmen linked to ISKP stormed Moscow’s Crocus City Hall concert venue, killing 133 people and injuring more than 100. The attack became the deadliest terrorist incident in Europe since the 2004 Beslan school siege.
The same year, ISKP claimed responsibility for a church shooting in Istanbul that killed a Turkish citizen.
According to terrorism researcher Aaron Zelin, ISKP was linked to 12 external attack plots in 2023 and at least 19 more in 2024. These plots stretched across Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and North America, including countries such as Russia, Germany, France, Belgium, Austria, India, Iran, Turkey, and the United States.
American intelligence agencies have also identified numerous ISKP-linked external attack plans targeting embassies, churches, commercial centers, and even the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar.
Despite international skepticism regarding the Taliban’s ability to govern, the group has mounted an aggressive campaign against ISKP.
A key component of this effort was the establishment of the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) in October 2021. The agency became the center of a nationwide intelligence-driven counterinsurgency strategy focused on identifying and eliminating ISKP networks.
The campaign produced notable operational successes.
In February 2023, Taliban forces killed several senior ISKP figures, including intelligence chief Qari Fateh, former minister of war Abu Osman, and the first emir of the Islamic State Hind Province. Taliban intelligence officials later reported that at least 12 senior ISKP commanders had been killed during 2023 alone.
The broader security statistics suggest significant progress.
Terrorism-related deaths in Afghanistan fell dramatically from 3,838 in 2021 to 1,087 in 2022 and then to just 218 in 2023. By the first half of 2026, the death toll stood at 77. Recorded terrorist incidents similarly declined from 325 in 2021 to only 15 during the first half of 2026.
Other datasets tell a similar story. The European Union Agency for Asylum documented a drop in ISKP-related events from 199 in 2022 to 49 in 2023. Meanwhile, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported a 72 percent decline in improvised explosive device (IED) incidents between 2022 and 2023.
The decline in violence inside Afghanistan has led some observers to describe the Taliban’s campaign as a counterterrorism success.
However, many analysts caution that the picture is more complicated.
Rather than eliminating ISKP, the Taliban may have forced the organization to evolve. Under sustained pressure at home, the group appears to have shifted resources toward international operations, where it can maintain relevance, attract recruits, and demonstrate resilience.
The attacks in Iran, Russia, and Turkey suggest that ISKP has not necessarily become weaker. Instead, it has become more geographically dispersed and strategically adaptive.
In this interpretation, the Taliban has reduced the domestic threat while inadvertently contributing to the globalization of the problem.
Any assessment of the Taliban’s security achievements must also examine the methods used to obtain them.
Human rights organizations have repeatedly accused Taliban authorities of conducting extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, and enforced disappearances.
Reports indicate that approximately 218 extrajudicial killings occurred between 2021 and 2023, targeting not only suspected ISKP members but also former government officials and security personnel.
In 2024, documented cases included 98 incidents of arbitrary detention and arrest, along with at least 20 allegations of torture or other forms of ill-treatment.
A 2024 investigation by *The New York Times* reported that 490 former Afghan government and security personnel were either killed or disappeared during the first six months of Taliban rule.
Such practices raise concerns about the long-term sustainability of the Taliban’s counterterrorism approach. Security analysts warn that collective punishment and abuses against civilian populations can create grievances that fuel future recruitment by extremist organizations.
Additionally, restrictions on media and civil society make independent verification difficult, leaving open questions about whether declining attack statistics fully reflect conditions on the ground.
Afghanistan’s security situation cannot be separated from its broader humanitarian crisis.
As of 2023, more than 28 million Afghans—nearly two-thirds of the population—required humanitarian assistance. By 2024, an estimated 23.7 million people still needed urgent aid, while 12.4 million faced food insecurity and 2.9 million experienced emergency levels of hunger.
The Taliban’s restrictions on women have further complicated relief efforts. Bans on female employment with the United Nations and international aid organizations have reduced the effectiveness of humanitarian operations across the country.
Afghanistan also remains the only country in the world where girls are prohibited from secondary and higher education. Approximately 2.2 million adolescent girls are currently barred from attending school, while more than 50 Taliban directives have imposed restrictions on women’s rights and participation in public life.
United Nations Special Rapporteur Richard Bennett has described the situation as an “institutionalized system of discrimination, segregation, disrespect for human dignity, and exclusion of women and girls.”
These conditions, experts argue, are inseparable from long-term security calculations. Chronic poverty, political repression, and social exclusion can create environments in which extremist movements continue to find opportunities for recruitment and survival.
The Taliban has demonstrably weakened ISKP’s operational capacity inside Afghanistan and significantly reduced the frequency of terrorist attacks. It has removed key leaders, disrupted networks, and restored a degree of internal security that was absent during the final years of the former Afghan government.
Yet ISKP remains active and dangerous. Rather than disappearing, it has adapted by expanding its focus internationally, emerging as a growing threat across Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.
At the same time, the Taliban’s counterterrorism strategy is intertwined with documented human rights abuses and governance policies that have deepened Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis.
For policymakers, the challenge is increasingly clear: engaging with the Taliban on counterterrorism may be necessary to contain ISKP, but tactical cooperation should not be mistaken for political legitimacy. Afghanistan’s security improvements are real, but they exist alongside profound human rights concerns and a terrorist threat that has become increasingly global in scope.
