For decades, the central question surrounding unmanned aviation was how robotic aircraft could support manned fighter jets. The concept of a loyal wingman, operating alongside a human-piloted aircraft, dominated discussions about the future of military aviation.
But advances in artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous flight, sensor fusion and precision weapons are beginning to challenge that assumption. The next generation of unmanned combat aircraft may not simply accompany fighter jets; they could increasingly perform independent air-combat missions and eventually challenge conventional fighters.
Türkiye’s Baykar-developed Bayraktar Kizilelma unmanned combat aircraft is emerging at this technological crossroads. Its development reflects a potentially fundamental shift in air-warfare doctrine, where autonomous aircraft could become independent combat platforms rather than secondary assets controlled by human pilots.
The implications extend beyond Türkiye. As NATO members and other military powers explore AI-enabled aerial combat, Kizilelma offers an early indication of how robotic fighters might reshape the balance between human judgment, machine intelligence and air superiority.
The technological foundations of this transformation have already been demonstrated. In 2020, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) conducted its AlphaDogfight Trials, in which an artificial intelligence algorithm defeated an experienced US Air Force F-16 pilot in five simulated engagements. The exercises involved restricted, gun-based dogfighting scenarios rather than the full complexity of modern aerial warfare. Nevertheless, the results demonstrated that algorithms could outperform experienced human pilots in calculating engagement geometry, predicting movements and executing tactical manoeuvres.
DARPA subsequently moved beyond simulation. Under its Air Combat Evolution (ACE) programme, the AI-controlled X-62A VISTA, an experimental aircraft derived from the F-16, conducted aerial combat manoeuvres against human-piloted F-16s during testing in 2023 and 2024.
European defence companies have pursued similar experiments. In June 2025, Sweden’s Saab and Germany’s Helsing tested the latter’s Centaur artificial intelligence system aboard a Gripen E fighter. Under Project Beyond, the aircraft engaged in beyond-visual-range scenarios against a human-piloted Gripen D, demonstrating autonomous manoeuvring, sensor processing and target tracking.
These experiments indicate that the future of aerial combat will involve much more than replacing human pilots with algorithms. The decisive transformation will come from integrating sensors, weapons, autonomous decision-making and mission coordination into a unified combat architecture.
This is where Kizilelma becomes particularly significant.
The aircraft’s military potential is closely linked to its sophisticated sensor architecture, which incorporates three advanced systems developed by Turkish defence electronics manufacturer ASELSAN. These include the MURAD active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, the KARAT infrared search-and-track (IRST) system and the TOYGUN electro-optical targeting system (EOTS).
MURAD provides radar-based detection and multiple-target tracking, supporting beyond-visual-range engagements and missile guidance. KARAT allows the aircraft to detect infrared signatures without relying on active radar emissions, reducing the possibility of revealing its position. TOYGUN provides high-resolution electro-optical imagery, automatic target recognition and laser-targeting capabilities.
During flight testing in April, KARAT reportedly detected a passenger aircraft from approximately 68 miles (109 kilometres) away. Although detection range depends on environmental conditions and target characteristics, the reported performance highlights the potential of passive infrared sensing in aerial surveillance.
The significance of this architecture lies in sensor fusion. Radar, infrared and electro-optical systems can provide complementary information, allowing an aircraft’s combat computer to construct a more comprehensive tactical picture. When combined with AI-assisted processing, such information could support faster threat identification, target prioritisation and engagement decisions.
This architecture also distinguishes Kizilelma from conventional loyal-wingman concepts. Rather than functioning primarily as an expendable aircraft carrying additional missiles for a manned fighter, Baykar is developing a platform with its own sophisticated sensors, weapons and increasingly advanced autonomous capabilities. The ultimate objective is to give an unmanned aircraft the capacity to undertake complex combat missions with reduced dependence on continuous human control.
The strategic attraction of robotic combat aviation is also connected to the political and human costs of conventional air warfare. The capture of an Indian fighter pilot during the February 2019 aerial confrontation with Pakistan demonstrated how an air-combat incident could quickly become a diplomatic and political crisis. Similarly, the high-risk operation to recover American F-15E aircrew following the aircraft’s loss over Iran in April highlighted the operational challenges associated with rescuing personnel behind enemy lines.
Unmanned combat aircraft cannot eliminate the risks of military operations, but they can reduce the possibility of pilots being killed, captured or taken hostage. This changes the calculation for commanders contemplating missions in heavily defended airspace. The loss of an expensive robotic aircraft can still represent a significant military and financial setback, but it does not necessarily carry the same immediate human and political consequences.
Baykar has outlined five Kizilelma configurations: A, B, CA, CB and D. Their development reflects another important dimension of the programme: Türkiye’s growing defence-industrial cooperation with Ukraine.
The initial configurations rely on Ukrainian-designed propulsion technology. The aircraft’s early platform uses the AI-25TLT turbofan, while later versions are expected to employ the more powerful afterburning AI-322F engine. Supersonic performance remains a longer-term ambition. Türkiye is also pursuing domestic alternatives through Turkish Aerospace Industries’ subsidiary TEI and its TF6000 and TF10000 turbofan engine programmes.
The Ukrainian connection carries particular geopolitical significance. During the early stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Baykar’s TB2 armed drones became prominent in Ukraine’s efforts to attack Russian armoured formations, logistics and military positions. The relationship has since evolved into a more complex defence-industrial partnership, with Ukrainian engine technology contributing to Türkiye’s next-generation unmanned combat aircraft.
Ukraine has also pursued agreements with France and Sweden to modernise its air force. However, the prospect of Ukrainian Kizilelma squadrons operating from the country’s air bases during the 2030s cannot be dismissed, particularly if production, political circumstances and operational requirements align.
Naval aviation represents another potentially important direction. The CA configuration is intended to support carrier-based operations, potentially complementing Türkiye’s planned MUGEM aircraft carrier project. Türkiye has already explored the operational possibilities of unmanned naval aviation through the Bayraktar TB3, which has operated from the amphibious assault ship TCG Anadolu and participated in NATO-related exercises.
Deploying Kizilelma from naval platforms would introduce a new dimension to carrier operations. Unmanned aircraft could undertake surveillance, strike and potentially air-defence missions while reducing the personnel risks associated with conventional carrier-based aviation. However, successful deployment would require specialised launch-and-recovery systems, navalised aircraft configurations and a trained cadre of unmanned aviation operators.
The aircraft’s weapons integration is equally important. Its expanding arsenal includes the Gökdoğan beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile, TOLUN precision-guided munition, TEBER-82 guidance kit, LGK-82 laser-guidance kit and JET-230 aeroballistic missile. Internal weapons bays are intended to preserve low-observable characteristics by reducing the need to carry weapons externally.
This combination of air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities could eventually allow Kizilelma to perform multiple mission profiles, including interception, precision strike and suppression of enemy air defences. Its actual effectiveness, however, will depend on operational testing, weapons integration, electronic-warfare resilience and performance against advanced adversary air-defence networks.
Baykar’s announcement that it had delivered the first three aircraft to Türkiye’s security forces has also attracted attention. The company did not publicly identify the receiving institution, leaving questions about the intended operational role of the initial aircraft.
Ukraine offers an interesting precedent for the expanding institutional role of robotic warfare. Its Security Service (SBU) demonstrated the reach of unconventional unmanned operations through Operation Spiderweb, which targeted Russian military aviation, while Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) has developed innovative approaches to unmanned naval warfare, including operations against Russian positions and infrastructure.
Whether Turkish intelligence or security institutions could eventually operate Kizilelma remains speculative. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian experience demonstrates how autonomous and remotely operated systems are increasingly blurring traditional boundaries between conventional military operations, intelligence activities and covert wartime missions.
Economics will ultimately determine whether Kizilelma becomes a significant component of future air forces or remains a technologically impressive but limited programme. Production capacity, maintenance requirements, engine availability, software upgrades and lifecycle costs will influence its affordability and operational sustainability.
Indonesia’s agreement to acquire 12 aircraft provides an indication of the platform’s export potential. Other possible markets include Gulf countries, Azerbaijan and NATO members seeking to expand their unmanned combat capabilities. However, international adoption will depend on performance, political relationships, technology-transfer arrangements and compatibility with existing military systems.
For NATO, the emergence of autonomous combat aircraft comes at a time when military planners are increasingly concerned about combat mass, distributed sensing, industrial resilience and the ability to sustain high-intensity warfare. Expensive fifth-generation fighters remain essential, but their limited numbers and high operating costs create opportunities for complementary unmanned platforms.
Kizilelma could contribute to this emerging model by providing additional combat aircraft, distributing operational risks and expanding the number of sensors and weapons available to commanders. Its participation in multinational exercises and potential integration into allied defence networks could also provide valuable experience in autonomous operations.
The aircraft is not yet a proven replacement for conventional fighters, particularly advanced fifth-generation platforms equipped with sophisticated stealth, sensor-fusion and electronic-warfare capabilities. Its ability to survive in contested airspace, operate under electronic attack and make reliable decisions in complex combat environments remains to be demonstrated.
Nevertheless, the direction of development is unmistakable. The future of aerial warfare is increasingly likely to involve human pilots, autonomous fighters and interconnected combat systems operating together. By the 2030s, advances in AI, propulsion, sensor fusion and autonomous mission planning could bring unmanned combat aircraft much closer to the capabilities traditionally associated with manned fighters.
Kizilelma therefore represents more than another addition to Türkiye’s expanding defence industry. It is an early expression of a broader transformation in military aviation, one in which the decisive advantage may increasingly belong to the side capable of combining human command with the speed, precision and adaptability of intelligent machines. The age of autonomous air combat is approaching, and the traditional boundaries of air superiority are beginning to change.