Türkiye is rapidly expanding its military and strategic partnerships across the Middle East and South Asia as regional conflicts expose the security vulnerabilities of countries traditionally dependent on Western military protection. Its latest move is a mutual defence agreement with Qatar, adding another dimension to Ankara’s growing ambition to become a central security power across the Islamic world.
The agreement, signed on November 13, 2026, in Istanbul by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, commits both countries to strengthening collective defence and adopting a unified position in the event of an external armed attack against either country.
According to a joint statement issued after their meeting, the agreement aims to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries while promoting regional security and stability. The two governments also agreed to consult on security threats, coordinate defence policies, expand joint military exercises, cooperate in defence industries and facilitate exchanges of military personnel for training.
Erdoğan described the agreement as a new dimension in the longstanding relationship between the two countries. He said Ankara and Doha would continue working together to prevent another outbreak of war in the Gulf, establish a foundation for dialogue and promote regional peace.
The agreement comes at a particularly sensitive moment for Qatar, which has found itself exposed to military threats from both Iran and Israel despite maintaining close relations with Washington and pursuing a diplomatic role in regional conflicts.
During the ongoing US-Israeli confrontation with Iran, Tehran launched missiles and drones against several Gulf countries, including Qatar. Iranian attacks and their repercussions affected strategic infrastructure across the region, including Qatar’s critical energy facilities. The Ras Laffan liquefied natural gas complex, one of the world’s most important LNG production hubs, also suffered damage.
Although Qatar has not participated directly in US military operations against Iran, its territory hosts the strategically important Al Udeid Air Base, the largest American military installation in the Middle East.
Qatar had already experienced an extraordinary violation of its sovereignty in September 2025, when Israel launched an airstrike in Doha targeting senior Hamas political leaders. The attack struck residential buildings where Hamas officials were meeting to discuss a US-backed ceasefire proposal for Gaza.
The operation killed several people, including a member of Qatar’s internal security forces, although the senior Hamas leaders survived.
The strike shocked Doha and exposed the vulnerability of a country that had long considered its diplomatic relationships and close partnership with the United States sufficient protection against direct military attacks.
Qatar condemned the operation as a violation of its sovereignty and international law. US President Donald Trump also criticised Israel, saying that unilaterally bombing Qatar did not advance American or Israeli interests. He subsequently assured the Qatari leadership that such an incident would not happen again on Qatari soil.
These developments have reinforced Qatar’s interest in diversifying its security partnerships rather than relying exclusively on American protection.
The latest agreement with Qatar is not an isolated development. Türkiye has been working to establish a broader network of military and defence-industrial relationships involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Indonesia.
On October 21, 2026, Türkiye, Qatar, Pakistan and Indonesia signed the Badr Memorandum of Understanding in Doha, establishing a framework for cooperation in defence production, technology development, information exchange, research and military-industrial capabilities.
According to Qatar’s official news agency, the initiative is intended to strengthen the participating countries’ ability to develop indigenous defence capabilities and meet their military requirements through cooperation.
Türkiye’s Presidency of Defence Industries described the agreement as an opportunity to combine the complementary industrial and technological capabilities of the four countries.
The Badr initiative is particularly significant because Türkiye possesses an established defence-industrial base, while Pakistan has substantial experience in military production, including aircraft, missiles and armoured systems. Qatar has considerable financial resources, and Indonesia offers a large industrial and technological market.
However, the Badr memorandum is a defence-industrial cooperation framework, not a mutual defence treaty. It does not establish an automatic military obligation to defend another signatory.
Türkiye is nevertheless the pivotal player in this emerging arrangement. Ankara already maintains substantial military ties with Qatar, including a military installation that has historically accommodated approximately 5,000 Turkish troops. Erdoğan previously described the Turkish military presence in Qatar as a symbol of brotherhood, friendship, solidarity and sincerity.
For Indonesia, participation in the Badr initiative also requires a careful diplomatic balance. Jakarta has traditionally followed its independent and active foreign policy, emphasising strategic autonomy, neutrality and non-alignment with major power blocs. Its involvement in defence-industrial cooperation does not necessarily indicate an intention to join a military alliance.
More consequential than the Badr memorandum is the Makkah Agreement for Joint Defence, signed by Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on August 7, 2026.
The agreement builds on the strategic relationship between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which had previously signed their Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in September 2025. However, the new trilateral arrangement significantly expands the relationship by bringing Türkiye into a formal collective-defence framework.
Unlike the Badr memorandum, the Makkah agreement contains a mutual defence provision.
Its Article 2 states that an external armed attack against any participating country will be considered an attack against all three. The agreement also commits the signatories to provide assistance to a country subjected to armed aggression, using their available capabilities, including military means.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has described the commitment as technically similar to NATO’s Article 5, although the nature and extent of assistance would be determined through consultations and an assessment of the circumstances.
The agreement was approved by the Turkish parliament on November 6, with 279 votes in favour and 119 against. Its ratification law was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on November 14.
Turkish officials have insisted that the arrangement is defensive and does not target any particular country. Deputy Foreign Minister Levent Gümrükçü has also presented Ankara’s approach as one of regional integration rather than the creation of an exclusive military bloc.
Taken together, the Makkah agreement, the Badr initiative and the new Qatar-Türkiye defence agreement demonstrate Ankara’s determination to expand its strategic influence beyond NATO’s traditional geographical and political framework.
Türkiye’s expanding defence diplomacy is not limited to Islamic countries.
On October 22, during Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s historic visit to Ankara, the two NATO allies launched a Strategic Partnership covering trade, energy, defence and people-to-people relations. They also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Sector Partnerships.
The agreement is intended to connect Canadian and Turkish defence companies, encourage joint industrial projects and create opportunities for technological cooperation and international exports.
Carney described Türkiye as one of the world’s most dynamic economies, highlighting its second-largest standing military within NATO and its increasingly important defence industry.
Erdoğan, meanwhile, described the agreement as the beginning of a new era in relations between the two countries.
For Ankara, the partnership has significance beyond commercial opportunities. Canada is a G7 country and a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network. Its renewed defence-industrial engagement with Türkiye provides an important diplomatic and industrial endorsement of Ankara’s defence sector, particularly after Canada previously imposed restrictions on certain military exports to Türkiye.
The development also illustrates Türkiye’s strategy of maintaining relationships with Western allies while simultaneously building new security arrangements across the Middle East and South Asia.
The most important question surrounding Türkiye’s expanding defence partnerships is whether Ankara possesses the military capabilities and political willingness to defend its partners if a major regional war erupts.
Its military is among the strongest in the Islamic world. Türkiye possesses a large standing army, a capable navy, a growing aerospace industry, advanced drone technology, modern missile systems and considerable experience in regional military operations.
Its defence industry has also become increasingly self-reliant, particularly in unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare, armoured vehicles and naval platforms.
Nevertheless, the ability to manufacture weapons, train partner forces and conduct limited military deployments is fundamentally different from confronting a major military power in a prolonged war.
Israel would represent one of Türkiye’s most difficult challenges.
Israel possesses an advanced air force equipped with F-35 stealth fighters, sophisticated intelligence capabilities, nuclear weapons and a powerful domestic defence industry. Its military relationship with the United States provides another substantial strategic advantage.
If Israel launches another attack against Qatar, Türkiye could assist Doha through intelligence sharing, air-defence cooperation, military deployments, electronic warfare capabilities and diplomatic pressure.
However, directly confronting the Israeli military would be an entirely different proposition. Türkiye does not possess the same level of airpower, intelligence integration or strategic support from Washington. Ankara would face significant operational and political constraints in attempting to prevent an Israeli air operation.
Iran presents another challenge.
The ongoing conflict has demonstrated that Iran retains considerable capacity to launch missiles and drones despite sustained US and Israeli military operations. Its geographically dispersed missile infrastructure, extensive arsenal and ability to conduct asymmetric warfare make it difficult to neutralise completely.
If Tehran attacks Qatar or Saudi Arabia, Türkiye could provide intelligence, military equipment, air-defence systems and operational assistance. However, there is no guarantee that Ankara could prevent Iranian missile and drone attacks.
Even the combined military capabilities of Türkiye and Pakistan would face considerable difficulties in stopping a large-scale Iranian offensive without broader international military cooperation.
India, however, could represent Türkiye’s most complicated strategic test.
India possesses one of the world’s largest armed forces, nuclear weapons, a powerful air force, an expanding missile arsenal and a growing blue-water navy equipped with two aircraft carriers. Its enormous economy also provides the financial resources necessary to sustain a prolonged military confrontation.
Türkiye has developed close defence relations with Pakistan, India’s principal regional rival. Ankara has supplied military equipment, supported defence-industrial cooperation and strengthened military-to-military relations with Islamabad.
At the same time, India maintains important strategic relationships with Israel, Greece and Cyprus, all of which have complicated relations with Türkiye.
These relationships do not necessarily mean that those countries would directly participate in a conflict involving India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, their diplomatic, technological and defence-industrial cooperation could create additional challenges for Ankara.
India’s expanding naval capabilities could also threaten Turkish strategic and commercial interests across the wider Indian Ocean region.
Türkiye cannot automatically expect NATO to intervene in such a confrontation. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is not an unconditional commitment to participate in every conflict involving a member state. Its application depends on the circumstances of an armed attack, and each ally determines the assistance it considers necessary.
A Turkish decision to support Pakistan in a war with India would therefore not automatically bring the entire NATO alliance into the conflict.
Ultimately, Türkiye’s emerging defence partnerships are likely to provide Ankara with greater diplomatic influence, defence-export opportunities and a stronger strategic presence across the Middle East and South Asia.
They also give countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan additional security partners at a time when confidence in traditional arrangements is being tested.
However, there is a considerable difference between signing a mutual defence agreement and possessing the military capacity to defeat a powerful adversary.
Türkiye can realistically be expected to supply weapons, intelligence, training, logistical assistance and defensive military technology to its partners. It may also deploy forces in limited circumstances where its national interests are directly involved.
But committing its armed forces to a full-scale war against Israel, Iran or India would carry enormous military, economic and diplomatic risks.
The new agreements therefore represent an important expansion of Türkiye’s strategic ambitions, but they should not be mistaken for an assurance that Ankara can protect every ally against every military threat.
Erdoğan is building a wider security network. Whether that network can withstand a major war remains an entirely different question.
