South Korea’s emergence as a major global arms exporter is challenging a traditional measure of military-industrial strength: the number of weapons a country manufactures and sells abroad. Increasingly, defence experts argue that a country’s industrial power should also be measured by its ability to develop long-term manufacturing partnerships, share technology, participate in international supply chains and jointly produce advanced military equipment.
This shift in thinking carries important lessons for India, which is seeking to become both self-reliant in defence production and a credible global arms exporter.
South Korea provides an increasingly compelling example of how a country can move beyond conventional arms exports to become an important partner in the international defence-industrial ecosystem. Having transformed itself from a major arms importer in the 1970s into one of the world’s leading weapons suppliers, Seoul is now pursuing a broader strategy centred on co-production, technology collaboration and industrial integration with friendly countries.
South Korea ranked ninth among the world’s largest arms exporters in 2023. Its defence export orders increased from approximately $3 billion in 2020 to $7.3 billion in 2021 and $17.3 billion in 2022. Orders subsequently stood at $13.5 billion in 2023 and $9.6 billion in 2024 before rebounding to approximately $15.4 billion in 2025.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), South Korea’s share of global arms exports increased by 24 per cent between the 2016–20 and 2021–25 periods. The country has established an ambitious objective of becoming the world’s fourth-largest defence exporter by 2030, behind the United States, France, Russia and Germany.
Its growing international presence is supported by a combination of technological capability, industrial capacity, competitive pricing and relatively rapid delivery schedules. South Korean manufacturers have established themselves in international markets through platforms such as the K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzer, K2 Black Panther main battle tank, FA-50 light combat aircraft and Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher, alongside naval platforms, missiles and electronic warfare systems.
However, the more significant development is taking place beyond the export market.
Seoul increasingly recognises that selling military equipment is only one component of a successful defence-industrial strategy. Establishing manufacturing facilities abroad, sharing technologies, developing local suppliers and maintaining long-term industrial relationships can generate considerably greater strategic influence than individual procurement agreements.
This approach is examined in the latest issue of Asan Security Quarterly, titled South Korea as a Defense Industrial Partner. The publication brings together perspectives from former government officials, defence specialists and regional security experts to examine how South Korea can strengthen its position as a long-term industrial partner.
Dr. Kang Eunho, former minister of South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), argues that the country must move beyond its traditional reliance on arms exports and establish itself as a leading participant in international defence-industrial cooperation.
Other contributions examine opportunities with Japan, Australia, the United States, Europe, Southeast Asia and the Arab Gulf states.
Hideshi Tokuchi, former Japanese vice-minister for defence and president of the Research Institute for Peace and Security, examines the possibilities for South Korea-Japan defence-industrial cooperation. Former Australian ambassador to South Korea Bill Paterson argues for a longer-term partnership built around the complementary industrial capabilities of the two countries.
Hunter Stires, a former maritime strategist to the US secretary of the Navy, examines the potential contribution of Korean shipbuilders, including Hanwha and HD Hyundai, to revitalising America’s maritime industrial base. His argument extends beyond allowing Korean companies to construct vessels in their domestic shipyards for export. It calls for sustained investment, technology transfer and deeper integration into the American shipbuilding ecosystem.
Other contributors examine differences in European approaches to defence-industrial cooperation with South Korea, Southeast Asian procurement priorities and opportunities for expanding partnerships with Gulf countries, particularly in air and missile defence, manufacturing localisation and maritime capabilities.
A common argument runs through these assessments: the future of defence-industrial cooperation should move away from a conventional buyer-seller relationship towards co-development, co-production and partnerships that can extend into third-country markets.
For India, this argument deserves particular attention.
New Delhi has made defence self-reliance a central pillar of its military modernisation strategy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The domestic production of the Tejas Mk1A fighter, the development of the Arjun Mk1A main battle tank, the commissioning of the indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant and defence exports exceeding ₹23,622 crore, or approximately $2.5 billion, demonstrate the progress of India’s defence manufacturing sector.
Yet indigenous production alone may not be sufficient to address India’s immediate security requirements, technological gaps and growing demand for advanced military equipment.
South Korea’s experience suggests a third approach between complete dependence on foreign suppliers and an insistence on developing every component domestically. That approach combines indigenous design capabilities with international co-manufacturing, shared technological development and industrial partnerships.
The KF-21 fighter programme offers an example. South Korea involved Indonesia as a development partner, originally assigning Jakarta a 20 per cent share of development costs. Although Indonesia subsequently encountered financial difficulties and sought adjustments to its contribution, Seoul pursued negotiations rather than abandoning the partnership.
The arrangement offered South Korea an opportunity to distribute development costs, expand the programme’s international participation and establish a potential export relationship. It also demonstrated how international collaboration can support an ambitious domestic aerospace programme.
South Korea’s defence agreement with Poland provides another important example.
The approximately $14 billion package announced in 2022 included K2 tanks, K9 self-propelled howitzers and other military equipment. South Korea initially supplied equipment from its own military inventories to help Poland meet urgent operational requirements while also establishing a longer-term manufacturing arrangement.
The broader objective included developing Polish production capacity for the K2PL tank and expanding local participation in the manufacture and maintenance of military equipment.
Under this approach, South Korea retains control over key technologies and design capabilities while allowing its partner to develop manufacturing expertise and become part of the production chain.
The FA-50 light combat aircraft demonstrates another aspect of Seoul’s pragmatic approach. Rather than waiting for every component to become domestically available, South Korea incorporated established foreign technologies into the aircraft’s development and production. This helped accelerate its entry into international markets while allowing domestic technological capabilities to develop progressively.
India’s experience with the Tejas programme illustrates why such flexibility can matter.
The Light Combat Aircraft programme took several decades to progress from its initial development phase to operational clearance. Delays in developing critical technologies, including engines and other sophisticated subsystems, complicated the Indian Air Force’s modernisation requirements.
The Tejas Mk1A reflects a more pragmatic approach by combining an indigenous aircraft design and mission systems with foreign technologies, including the American GE F404 engine and an Israeli-origin radar.
India’s earlier licensed-production arrangements for aircraft such as the MiG-21, Jaguar and Su-30MKI provided manufacturing experience but did not necessarily give Indian industry equivalent design authority or intellectual property rights.
That distinction is important. Conventional licensed production often leaves the recipient dependent on foreign design approvals, technology restrictions and component supplies. Genuine co-manufacturing, by contrast, involves shared industrial responsibilities, investment and technological participation while allowing the original designer to retain control over essential intellectual property.
India could explore such arrangements with friendly countries by allowing strategic partners to manufacture selected portions of Indian-designed platforms under Indian quality and certification standards.
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), for example, could examine opportunities to establish assembly or manufacturing facilities for platforms such as the HTT-40 basic trainer or Advanced Light Helicopter Dhruv in Southeast Asian or South American markets. Similar opportunities could be explored for artillery systems, multiple rocket launchers and air-defence equipment.
Such arrangements would transform foreign buyers into industrial stakeholders rather than leaving them as customers dependent entirely on imported equipment.
India’s existing defence-industrial relationship with South Korea offers a foundation for this approach.
The K9 Vajra-T artillery programme, involving South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace and India’s Larsen & Toubro (L&T), demonstrates the advantages of combining foreign technology with domestic manufacturing. The Indian Army acquired an advanced artillery platform, while Indian industry developed production experience and capabilities to manufacture the system locally.
In April 2025, L&T and Hanwha also reached an agreement to manufacture an additional 100 K9 Vajra self-propelled howitzers in India. The arrangement illustrates how defence procurement can contribute to a wider industrial partnership rather than remaining a one-time commercial transaction.
The maritime sector presents another significant opportunity.
During South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s visit to India in April 2026, the two countries adopted a comprehensive cooperation framework covering shipbuilding, shipping and maritime logistics, known as VOYAGES.
The framework envisages Korean participation in developing India’s shipbuilding capabilities through cooperation in production engineering, advanced manufacturing, quality control, safety standards and operational management.
A proposed greenfield shipyard at Thoothukudi in Tamil Nadu, involving HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering, represents an important development under this initiative. It could bring Korean production engineering expertise and advanced shipbuilding practices into India’s domestic industrial ecosystem.
The challenge now is to extend this cooperation beyond commercial shipping.
India could explore similar arrangements in naval shipbuilding, submarine construction, marine propulsion systems, advanced electronic warfare sensors and autonomous maritime platforms. Rather than relying exclusively on imported vessels and technologies, New Delhi could use Korean industrial expertise to strengthen domestic manufacturing and develop a wider network of component suppliers, specialised engineering companies and research institutions.
This would also create opportunities for skilled employment, technology development and long-term industrial investment.
The policy framework governing Indian defence procurement may also require adjustments to accommodate this approach.
India’s Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) places considerable emphasis on the Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured (IDDM) category. However, defence planners could consider creating stronger incentives for an additional category centred on indigenously designed and co-manufactured equipment.
Such an approach would allow Indian companies to retain meaningful intellectual property rights while collaborating with international manufacturers to accelerate production, improve technological capabilities and meet operational requirements.
The concept of Indigenously Designed and Co-Manufactured (IDCM) platforms could complement the existing IDDM framework rather than replace it. Foreign participation could be encouraged where it guarantees substantial Indian manufacturing, technology transfer, domestic supply-chain development and clearly defined intellectual property arrangements.
The strategic advantages extend beyond manufacturing.
When two countries jointly develop military equipment, maintain common platforms and depend on each other for components, their defence relationships become more deeply interconnected. Such cooperation can improve interoperability, strengthen diplomatic relations and create industrial commitments that are considerably more durable than conventional arms purchases.
South Korea’s experience therefore offers India an important lesson: self-reliance does not necessarily mean technological isolation.
India should identify areas where its domestic industrial capabilities complement those of foreign partners, whether in South Korea, Israel, France, the United States, Russia or other countries. The objective should be to negotiate arrangements that provide meaningful participation in design, research, manufacturing, maintenance and future technological upgrades.
Ultimately, a country’s defence-industrial strength should not be judged exclusively by how many weapons it produces or how much military equipment it exports. Its ability to become an indispensable partner in international manufacturing networks, technological development and long-term defence cooperation may prove equally important.
South Korea is attempting to build precisely that position. For India, combining indigenous production with international co-manufacturing could provide a practical route towards becoming not only a major defence manufacturer but also a more influential participant in the global defence-industrial order.
