Europe’s ambitious Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program, once envisioned as the cornerstone of the continent’s next-generation airpower strategy, is increasingly showing signs of fragmentation as tensions between key industrial partners threaten to derail the project’s most critical component — the New Generation Fighter (NGF).
The FCAS program, valued at nearly €100 billion, was designed as a comprehensive “system of systems” architecture integrating a sixth-generation fighter aircraft, autonomous remote carriers or “loyal wingman” drones, advanced sensors, and a combat cloud enabling seamless multi-domain operations across air, land, sea, cyber, and space domains.
Led jointly by France, Germany, and Spain, the initiative initially appeared to embody Europe’s strategic ambition for defense autonomy. Under the industrial arrangement, France’s Dassault Aviation was assigned leadership of the crewed NGF development, Airbus Defence and Space took charge of remote carriers, stealth technologies, and combat cloud integration, Spain’s Indra was tasked with sensor development, while Safran was responsible for propulsion systems.
However, despite years of political declarations and repeated commitments from European leaders, the program has steadily drifted into uncertainty amid a prolonged standoff between Airbus and Dassault over workshare, intellectual property rights, design authority, and supplier selection.
The dispute has now reached a point where Airbus is openly discussing alternative partnerships outside the traditional FCAS framework — most notably with Swedish defense giant Saab.
Speaking on May 27 during an interview with Swedish financial newspaper Dagens Industri, Airbus Defence and Space CEO Michael Schoellhorn indicated that the company was actively considering cooperation with Sweden and Saab on a future sixth-generation combat aircraft.
“We are open to a number of things. For Airbus, the crewed fighter aircraft is still an open question,” Schoellhorn said.
The Airbus executive emphasized that the company intended to remain deeply involved in the development of Europe’s next-generation fighter capability, regardless of the FCAS outcome.
“We will be involved in the development of such an aircraft. The structure within FCAS could be improved. That could lead to two fighter aircraft within FCAS, or to another form of cooperation, and Sweden and Saab are candidates with extensive expertise in this field,” he noted.
His remarks represent the clearest public indication yet that Airbus is preparing contingency plans should negotiations with Dassault collapse entirely.
According to Schoellhorn, discussions have already taken place between the German and Swedish governments, although Airbus described the talks as “productive but confidential.”
The comments underscore growing frustration in Berlin and Madrid over Dassault’s insistence on maintaining dominant control over the NGF component of FCAS. Dassault CEO Eric Trappier has repeatedly argued that his company possesses unmatched expertise in designing complete combat aircraft systems, citing its decades-long experience developing the Mirage and Rafale fighter families.
Trappier has also hinted several times that Dassault could proceed independently if necessary, reinforcing concerns within Germany that the French contractor seeks disproportionate control over the program.
Germany and Airbus, meanwhile, remain unwilling to support a structure that they believe would marginalize German industry within Europe’s largest military aviation project.
The disagreement has slowed progress on the NGF considerably, raising concerns that FCAS risks falling significantly behind rival sixth-generation fighter programs already advancing elsewhere.
Schoellhorn warned that time was running out.
“If we are to have something that can be called sixth generation and that is airborne before the 2040s, we have to act now,” he said. “If we are still in limbo at the end of the year, that would be very challenging.”
Although Airbus continues to publicly support FCAS, its recent statements suggest that the company increasingly sees alternative industrial configurations as viable — and perhaps necessary.
One such possibility involves Sweden and Saab.
Sweden has a long tradition of independently developing advanced combat aircraft, from the Saab 37 Viggen during the Cold War to the JAS 39 Gripen currently in service with multiple air forces worldwide. Saab’s expertise in sensors, avionics, electronic warfare systems, lightweight airframes, and network-centric warfare makes it an attractive partner for Airbus should FCAS splinter.
Interestingly, Sweden itself has already begun work on a future combat aircraft initiative.
In October 2025, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration awarded Saab a contract worth approximately $276 million to conduct conceptual studies for a next-generation combat air system through 2027.
The Swedish program reportedly focuses on a “system of systems” approach similar to FCAS, involving both crewed and uncrewed platforms, advanced artificial intelligence, autonomous operations, and integration with loyal wingman drones.
This technological overlap could provide a natural basis for cooperation between Airbus and Saab.
Schoellhorn recently visited Sweden and emphasized Saab’s potential role in future European defense aviation efforts.
“Everyone is aware of the difficulties we face,” he said in reference to FCAS. “That is why it is time to actively explore other options, which is what we are now doing.”
The Airbus chief also suggested cooperation beyond fighter aircraft alone, including airborne early warning and control capabilities involving Saab’s GlobalEye platform.
“If we were to join forces, we could be a very capable team that could contribute many future capabilities,” Schoellhorn remarked.
For Germany, exploring alternatives has become increasingly important as doubts over FCAS continue to grow.
Reports from late 2025 indicated that Berlin had already begun evaluating several fallback options, including pursuing a fighter project independently with Spain or seeking new partnerships with Sweden or even the United Kingdom.
The UK, however, is already deeply invested in the separate Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) alongside Japan and Italy.
GCAP itself has emerged as one of FCAS’s principal competitors in the race to field a sixth-generation combat aircraft. The program aims to deliver a new fighter by 2035, significantly earlier than FCAS’s projected operational timeline.
Sweden was previously associated with GCAP as an observer nation but stepped back in 2023 due to concerns over costs, timelines, and differing operational requirements.
Saab CEO Michael Johansson later described Sweden’s position as a “hibernation period,” indicating that Stockholm had chosen to observe developments before committing more deeply.
That decision now appears increasingly significant as Airbus searches for new strategic alignments.
Nevertheless, any shift toward Saab would not automatically resolve Europe’s broader combat aviation fragmentation problem.
One major challenge remains political alignment. France continues to view strategic autonomy and industrial sovereignty as central pillars of FCAS, and Paris may resist any restructuring that reduces Dassault’s leadership role.
At the same time, Sweden has historically prioritized maintaining domestic control over its fighter aircraft programs. Saab’s long-standing philosophy of technological independence could complicate attempts to fully integrate into a multinational structure dominated by larger powers.
Still, Germany appears increasingly prepared to decouple parts of FCAS if necessary.
Earlier this year, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz acknowledged that while collaborative defense systems under FCAS were likely to continue, joint development of a single fighter aircraft remained uncertain.
“There will definitely be joint systems,” Merz said in January 2026. “We are currently in intensive talks with France about the extent to which we will continue to develop and build joint aircraft.”
Airbus has similarly floated proposals involving separate fighter designs operating under a shared FCAS architecture, potentially preserving cooperation on networking systems, drones, sensors, and data-sharing technologies while abandoning the idea of a single unified aircraft.
Such a model would mark a major departure from FCAS’s original vision but could offer a pragmatic compromise that preserves at least parts of the broader program.
Meanwhile, speculation persists that Germany could eventually seek closer ties with GCAP if FCAS negotiations fail completely.
Schoellhorn acknowledged that possibility during his interview.
“GCAP is an existing alternative that could be considered,” he said. “The defense industry submits proposals; the politicians decide what is to be done.”
However, joining GCAP may prove politically and industrially difficult. Japan, one of the program’s three core partners, has reportedly been cautious about expanding membership, fearing additional participants could introduce delays and complicate already sensitive multinational coordination.
As Europe’s competing sixth-generation fighter initiatives continue to evolve, FCAS now faces a defining moment.
What began as a flagship symbol of European defense integration risks becoming another example of the industrial rivalries and national interests that have historically fragmented the continent’s military aviation sector.
For Airbus, cooperation with Saab may represent both leverage in ongoing negotiations with Dassault and a genuine strategic alternative should FCAS fail to produce a viable path forward.
Whether France and Germany can still salvage the NGF partnership remains uncertain. But with rival programs advancing rapidly and technological timelines tightening, Europe’s defense industry may soon be forced to choose between compromise and fragmentation.
