Southeast Asia may soon become the next theater of competition between two of the world’s most aggressively marketed fourth-generation-plus combat aircraft — France’s Dassault Rafale and China’s Chengdu J-10C. The potential confrontation isn’t just one of hardware and firepower; it is a contest of strategic alignment, affordability, and geopolitical clout, with Indonesia emerging as the newest battleground.
Jakarta’s growing ambitions to overhaul its air force, coupled with a pragmatic, non-aligned foreign policy, have brought it to a pivotal crossroads. On one path lies continued deepening of military ties with France, following a landmark $8.1 billion deal signed in 2022 for 42 Rafale fighters. On the other, a potentially budget-friendly, rapidly deliverable offer from China to supply its domestically produced J-10C jets, recently combat-tested by Pakistan.
Both aircraft now stand as symbols of competing military-industrial blocs — one rooted in transatlantic cooperation and NATO interoperability, the other emerging from Beijing’s ambitions to become a global defense supplier.
During a public discussion in Jakarta in late May 2025, Indonesian Deputy Defense Minister Donny Ermawan Taufanto disclosed that China had offered J-10C fighter jets to Indonesia. This offer, made during a visit by Indonesian Air Force personnel to China, includes not just fighter aircraft, but also naval vessels, frigates, and arms — a comprehensive military package that suggests Beijing is looking to build long-term strategic influence in the region.
“This is just an offer,” Taufanto told the media, emphasizing the early stage of discussions. “We have had talks with China, and they offered us a lot.”
The Indonesian government, he explained, is conducting a preliminary assessment of whether the J-10C can be integrated into its existing military ecosystem. No technical team has been dispatched yet, but the offer is being weighed alongside Jakarta’s broader defense modernization goals.
The Chinese pitch comes at a time when the J-10C has gained prominence through its deployment by Pakistan — especially during its high-intensity standoff with India in early 2025. During that conflict, Pakistani officials claimed to have downed three Indian Rafale jets using J-10Cs equipped with PL-15E long-range air-to-air missiles, a statement that Beijing has actively used in its export marketing efforts, despite the lack of independent verification or official acknowledgment from India.
France’s Dassault Rafale, a multi-role fourth-generation-plus fighter jet, currently holds the upper hand in Indonesia’s procurement plans. In 2022, Jakarta inked a sweeping agreement for 42 Rafales, marking one of Southeast Asia’s most significant defense deals in recent history. The first batch of six aircraft is expected to be delivered in early 2026.
Despite the Rafale’s proven combat capabilities in Middle Eastern and African theaters, the fighter’s high price tag and expensive maintenance have drawn scrutiny from budget-conscious nations. Indonesia’s defense budget for 2024 stood at around $9 billion — making the Rafale a weighty investment. Additional platforms like the F-15EX or KF-21 under co-development with South Korea further stretch Indonesia’s financial and logistical capacities.
This environment creates fertile ground for the J-10C, which costs substantially less and could be delivered faster, allowing Indonesia to expand its fleet size more rapidly. However, this raises questions about long-term sustainment, interoperability, and geopolitical entanglement.
China and Pakistan’s claims regarding the J-10C’s performance against Rafales have created a ripple effect. Global Times, the Chinese state-owned publication, quoted Chinese military expert Fu Qianshao, who asserted that the J-10C “has been tested in actual combat” and demonstrated “exceptional beyond-visual-range air-to-air combat capabilities.”
Fu’s endorsement, coupled with Pakistan’s dramatic account of its battlefield success, has been deployed in what many defense analysts see as a strategic campaign to erode the credibility of Rafale exports — particularly in Asia and Africa, where China is aggressively marketing its defense products.
However, the absence of visual or technical proof from Pakistan’s side has led to widespread skepticism, including from within Indonesia itself.
“Unverified claims in conflict zones cannot be used as the sole basis for assessing the effectiveness or failure of a particular weapons system,” said Dave Laksono, a member of Indonesia’s House of Representatives. “Even the most advanced jets have been lost in war due to circumstances that have nothing to do with their intrinsic capability.”
This skepticism was reinforced when French President Emmanuel Macron visited Jakarta in May 2025 and signed a Letter of Intent to deepen defense cooperation. Standing next to Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, Macron stated that the agreement could “open new perspectives with new orders for Rafales, Scorpenes, light frigates.”
This reaffirmation has put to rest much of the speculation about Indonesia possibly reconsidering its Rafale deal — at least for now.
The real significance of Indonesia’s decision goes beyond the jets themselves. With a population of over 275 million, a burgeoning economy, and a geostrategic location spanning critical sea lanes, Indonesia is a linchpin in Southeast Asia’s security architecture. Whichever fighter jet it selects will not only bolster its air defense but also signal its broader geopolitical orientation.
Jakarta has made it a point to maintain a non-aligned foreign policy. It has military cooperation agreements or ongoing negotiations with a wide range of countries — France, the U.S., South Korea, Russia, and Turkey. It’s also looking into fifth-generation Turkish KAAN fighters and continues to engage in talks about Russia’s Su-35.
Such diversity is both a strength and a liability. On one hand, it ensures that Indonesia is not over-dependent on any single country. On the other, operating multiple fighter platforms — especially those with differing systems, weapons integration protocols, and maintenance needs — dramatically increases complexity and costs.
The Rafale and the J-10C represent two very different propositions. The Rafale is a highly capable, battle-tested platform designed for multirole missions with cutting-edge sensors and superior interoperability with Western forces. But this comes at a steep price, both in terms of acquisition and lifecycle maintenance.
The J-10C, while less sophisticated in some respects, offers a more affordable, rapidly deployable solution. It includes AESA radar, advanced avionics, and compatibility with long-range missiles like the PL-15E. The aircraft has proven versatile in Chinese and Pakistani service, though it lacks the same level of integration with global systems or NATO standards.
Choosing the J-10C could mean faster fleet expansion for Indonesia, especially if it prioritizes quantity and cost-efficiency. But it may also mean greater strategic dependence on China — something Jakarta has traditionally tried to avoid due to regional concerns over Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.
One of the least discussed yet most crucial aspects of Indonesia’s dilemma is interoperability. With potential acquisitions from France, the U.S., South Korea, Russia, and China all on the table, Indonesia risks creating an overly complex patchwork of systems.
Each of these aircraft — Rafale, F-15EX, KF-21, Su-35, and J-10C — comes with its own weapons, training modules, and logistics support chains. Managing this complexity could become untenable, especially in times of crisis when seamless integration and rapid response are essential.
For instance, if Indonesia were to acquire both Rafales and J-10Cs, its air force would have to manage two completely different ecosystems. The operational burden could force Jakarta to scale down one program in favor of the other — most likely the newer one, depending on performance reviews, delivery timelines, and political expediency.
Indonesia’s eventual decision will reverberate across the Asia-Pacific region. If it chooses to incorporate the J-10C into its arsenal, it would mark the first time a Southeast Asian country operates advanced Chinese fighter jets — potentially opening the door for similar deals in countries like Thailand or Myanmar.
Conversely, if Jakarta proceeds exclusively with Rafales or U.S.-backed fighters, it would reinforce Western influence in a region where strategic allegiances remain fluid.
Countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia — each facing their own modernization challenges — will be watching closely. The choice between Western and Chinese systems is no longer just about price and performance. It’s about the strategic trajectory of the Indo-Pacific, the balance of power, and who gets to shape the rules of the region.
As of mid-2025, Indonesia is still months away from making any binding decision on the J-10C. The arrival of the first batch of Rafales in 2026 will provide a clearer view of Jakarta’s operational preferences and defense priorities.
Should the country continue with the full Rafale acquisition while accepting a limited number of J-10Cs for specialized roles or rapid expansion, it could set a precedent for “dual-track” fighter procurement. But such a move would require significant increases in defense spending — a tall order for a government that is juggling infrastructure projects, social spending, and economic recovery in a post-pandemic world.
Indonesia’s fighter jet choices are about more than air superiority. They represent a balancing act between maintaining sovereignty, hedging alliances, and asserting leadership in an increasingly contested region. Whether it leans toward Paris or Beijing, or tries to walk the tightrope between both, Jakarta’s decision could redefine Southeast Asia’s aerial balance for decades.
