Taiwan’s top diplomat has issued a defiant response to what Taipei describes as an expanding campaign of pressure orchestrated by China, after several African nations abruptly revoked overflight permissions for the aircraft of Lai Ching-te. The move forced the postponement of Lai’s planned visit to Eswatini, the island’s last remaining diplomatic ally in Africa, highlighting the intensifying geopolitical contest over Taiwan’s international space.
Speaking during a visit to Eswatini, Lin Chia-lung condemned what he characterized as the “politicization and weaponization” of civil aviation routes. Lin, who attended the 40th anniversary of King Mswati III’s accession in place of Lai, emphasized that Taiwan would not yield to external coercion.
“No matter how China uses political power to interfere with normal international civil aviation operations, it will not make Taiwan bow its head,” Lin said in a public statement. He further underscored Taipei’s determination to maintain its international engagement despite mounting obstacles, adding that “no unreasonable blockade or pressure can shake our resolve.”
The controversy stems from the sudden decision by Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar to revoke overflight permits for Lai’s chartered aircraft. Taiwanese officials described the move as unexpected and lacking prior communication, suggesting coordination influenced by Beijing.
For Taiwan, such overflight permissions are not merely logistical details—they are symbolic of its contested sovereignty. Because most countries do not formally recognize Taiwan as a state, even routine diplomatic travel requires careful navigation through a patchwork of informal arrangements. Any disruption signals the fragility of Taipei’s global footprint.
The United States quickly weighed in, criticizing Beijing’s actions as part of a broader “intimidation campaign” against Taiwan and its partners. In response, Chinese officials rejected the accusation as baseless, reiterating their longstanding claim that Taiwan is an internal matter.
Beijing maintains that Taiwan is a breakaway province and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve reunification. This stance continues to shape both diplomatic maneuvering and military planning across the region.
Parallel to the diplomatic standoff, Taiwan has been steadily reinforcing its defense posture through what analysts call the “porcupine strategy”—a concept rooted in asymmetric warfare. Rather than attempting to match China’s military strength directly, Taiwan aims to make any invasion prohibitively costly.
At the core of this strategy is a rapidly expanding arsenal of anti-ship missiles designed to target an invading force during its most vulnerable phases: transit across the Taiwan Strait and amphibious landing operations.
Taiwanese defense planning envisions a scenario in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would need to transport tens of thousands of troops, vehicles, and supplies across roughly 130 kilometers of water. This complex logistical undertaking would involve a mix of amphibious assault ships, civilian ferries, and naval escorts—creating dense, high-value targets.
According to Taiwanese media and defense reports, Taipei is on track to produce more than 1,000 domestically developed Hsiung Feng II and Hsiung Feng III missiles by the end of 2026. When combined with approximately 400 U.S.-supplied Harpoon Coastal Defense System missiles, Taiwan’s inventory could exceed 1,400 anti-ship weapons in the coming years.
Given Taiwan’s coastline of about 1,566 kilometers, this translates to a theoretical density of nearly one missile per kilometer. In practice, deployment would be concentrated along the western coast facing China, increasing effective firepower in critical zones.
Despite Taiwan’s buildup, China retains a significant quantitative and qualitative advantage in missile capabilities. The PLA fields a diverse array of anti-ship systems, including the YJ-series cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles such as the DF-21D and DF-26—often dubbed “carrier killers.”
These systems offer greater range, speed, and payload capacity than most of Taiwan’s current inventory. However, China’s geographic scale introduces a different strategic calculus. With a coastline stretching roughly 14,500 kilometers—from the Bohai Sea to the South China Sea—its missile forces are distributed across a vast Area.
This dispersion supports China’s broader objective of power projection across the Western Pacific, forming an extensive anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) network designed to deter foreign intervention, particularly by the United States.
Taiwan, by contrast, is focused on localized, high-density defense. Its missile deployments are optimized for a single scenario: repelling or severely degrading an amphibious invasion.
Taiwan’s anti-ship capabilities are anchored by three principal systems: the Hsiung Feng II, Hsiung Feng III, and the U.S.-origin Harpoon Block II.
The Hsiung Feng II is a subsonic missile with a range of 150 to 250 kilometers. Its versatility allows deployment from land-based launchers, naval vessels, and aircraft. Designed for sea-skimming flight, it minimizes radar detection and is well-suited for saturating enemy defenses.
The more advanced Hsiung Feng III represents Taiwan’s flagship supersonic system. With speeds exceeding Mach 2 and a range of up to 400 kilometers in extended variants, it is engineered to penetrate sophisticated air defenses. Its ramjet propulsion and maneuverability make interception significantly more difficult.
The missile is equipped with a semi-armor-piercing warhead and a smart fuse designed to maximize internal damage upon impact. Reports indicate that the system directs explosive force downward within a ship’s hull, increasing lethality against large vessels.
Meanwhile, the Harpoon Coastal Defense System adds a layer of precision and flexibility. With a range exceeding 120 kilometers and GPS-guided navigation, it can strike both moving and stationary targets. Its two-way data link enables mid-flight retargeting—an important feature in rapidly evolving combat environments.
Taiwan has showcased these capabilities in recent military demonstrations. Footage released by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology depicted coordinated strikes using all three missile types against a simulated target ship.
The demonstration highlighted Taiwan’s emphasis on layered attacks—using multiple missile systems to overwhelm defenses and ensure mission success. Visual evidence showed distinct impact points corresponding to each missile type, underscoring their complementary roles.
Such exercises are intended not only to refine operational readiness but also to signal deterrence. By demonstrating the ability to inflict substantial losses on an invading fleet, Taiwan aims to influence Beijing’s cost-benefit calculations.
Taiwan is also investing in next-generation missile technology. In 2025, its defense ministry disclosed plans for a long-range subsonic anti-ship cruise missile under the Defense Industry Development Act.
While details remain limited, analysts believe the system will address current range limitations and potentially surpass the capabilities of existing platforms. Former defense official Lu De-yun suggested that the new missile could evolve into a “true carrier killer,” extending Taiwan’s reach deeper into contested waters.
The combination of diplomatic pressure and military buildup reflects the multidimensional nature of the Taiwan issue. Beijing’s efforts to restrict Taiwan’s international mobility—whether through aviation routes or diplomatic isolation—are unfolding alongside a steady escalation in military preparedness on both sides.
For Taiwan, the strategy is clear: maintain international visibility while building a credible deterrent. For China, the objective remains to constrain Taiwan’s options and reinforce its claim of sovereignty.
The risk lies in the intersection of these approaches. As Taiwan strengthens its defenses and asserts its autonomy, and as China intensifies both diplomatic and military pressure, the margin for miscalculation narrows.
