A new phase of the war in eastern Europe has begun to take shape far from the trenches and artillery duels that have defined much of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Reports from the battlefield indicate that Ukraine has been conducting a sustained campaign of mid-range drone strikes targeting Russian logistics infrastructure—cargo trucks, fuel tankers, rail assets, and supply convoys operating deep behind the front lines.
According to Ukrainian military personnel involved in the program, the effort is designed to systematically degrade Russia’s ability to move fuel and materiel into forward operating zones. The impact, they say, is already being felt along key supply corridors feeding occupied territories including routes toward Crimea and Russia’s positions in southern and eastern Ukraine.
In an exclusive interview, an Unmanned Systems Department officer from the First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine described how the campaign began, how it operates in practice, and how artificial intelligence and modified drone systems are being integrated into battlefield targeting cycles.
The officer framed the initiative not as a series of isolated drone missions, but as a continuous operational concept centered on logistics attrition.
“The reason why we are currently conducting this campaign is to hunt enemy logistics capabilities,” he explained. “We have quite cheap assets that can strike enemy targets at quite a deep range.”
The underlying logic, he said, is based on the structure of military supply chains. Near the front line, logistical movement is fragmented and low-volume—individual vehicles or small convoys. But as distance increases from the line of contact, the density of transported materiel increases dramatically: cars give way to trucks, trucks to long-haul convoys, and eventually rail transport becomes the dominant channel.
“In deeper areas, we’re talking about trains carrying supplies,” he said. “So the deeper we go, the higher the concentration of enemy cargo.”
The result, according to his description, is a mathematical asymmetry: while defending a narrow front-line corridor is feasible, protecting thousands of kilometers of supply routes deep in occupied territory becomes exponentially more difficult.
He said Ukrainian units are deliberately exploiting this gap by striking logistics nodes far beyond the immediate battlefield—sometimes up to 250 kilometers from the front.
At the core of the program are fixed-wing kamikaze drones, originally designed for shorter tactical ranges but now modified for extended operations.
“We’re using fixed-wing drones with modifications in communication systems,” the officer said. “We’ve installed Starlink systems and introduced changes in propulsion and engines.”
The integration of satellite communications—particularly systems provided by SpaceX’s Starlink service—has enabled improved command-and-control over longer distances. However, he stressed that Starlink is only one of several communications solutions used in the field.
He also confirmed the use of systems such as Hornet-type drones and Darts platforms, alongside other unmanned aerial systems that were not disclosed.
The modifications, he said, are carried out directly within operational units rather than centrally at higher headquarters.
“These are conducted by the units themselves,” he said. “We are modifying tactical-level UAVs into systems capable of operational-depth strikes.”
While he declined to provide precise technical details, citing operational security concerns, he confirmed that the range of modified systems now extends significantly beyond their original specifications, with some operations reaching approximately 250 kilometers.
One of the most significant developments in the campaign is the incorporation of artificial intelligence into the targeting and terminal guidance process.
According to the officer, AI is primarily used in two roles: target identification and last-mile navigation.
“The AI can identify the type of target and, in some cases, automatically engage it,” he said. “This allows us to launch several drones at the same time and coordinate attacks more effectively.”
In practice, this means drones can operate in partially autonomous modes, where onboard systems assist in recognizing vehicles and distinguishing between target types such as fuel trucks or cargo transports.
However, he emphasized that human operators remain central to the decision-making chain.
“In our case, the decision is made exclusively by the operator,” he said. “It is man in the loop.”
He described a layered system in which one drone may be used for reconnaissance and target observation while another executes the strike—an approach that increases precision and reduces the risk of misidentification in complex environments such as highways and rail corridors.
The campaign’s area of operations, according to the interview, covers major logistical arteries feeding Russian forces in occupied territories of eastern and southern Ukraine.
He specifically referenced corridors running through areas near Donetsk Oblast, including supply routes connected to Mariupol and onward toward Crimea.
Key regions discussed include Dobropillia, which lies within the broader operational focus of Ukrainian forces in the east, as well as contested logistical corridors in Donetsk Oblast and southern supply lines linked to Zaporizhzhia Oblast and occupied Crimea.
He described the system as an “all-Ukrainian operation,” with different units assigned responsibility for specific road segments or logistics zones.
A central claimed effect of the campaign is disruption of fuel logistics. The officer described fuel as the “blood of war,” emphasizing its importance not only for armored and vehicle movement but also for powering generators and supporting drone operations on both sides.
He argued that strikes against fuel convoys produce disproportionately large effects compared to tactical vehicle losses.
“Destroying a car might mean 40 liters of fuel,” he said. “But a fuel tanker represents several tons.”
While independent verification of the overall impact remains difficult, Ukrainian officials have previously reported localized fuel shortages in occupied areas, including parts of Crimea, which relies heavily on long supply chains across contested territory.
The interview also addressed Russian attempts to counter the expanding drone threat. According to the officer, Russian forces are experimenting with layered defenses including physical barriers such as nets, distributed personnel armed with shotguns along supply routes, and electronic warfare systems.
However, he argued that electronic warfare (EW) is only one component of a broader defensive ecosystem.
“There are hundreds of people trying to shoot drones down, interceptor drones, and physical barriers,” he said. “EW is only about 10% of counter-drone efforts.”
He claimed that Ukrainian tactics are evolving faster than Russian countermeasures, though he acknowledged that adaptation is ongoing on both sides.
“We already have countermeasures for their countermeasures,” he added.
The officer concluded with broader reflections on the implications of the campaign for other militaries, including the United States.
His central argument was that off-the-shelf drone systems are insufficient without continuous modification and adaptation.
“Drones in their basic configuration cannot bring the best results,” he said. “Each unit should have its own drone laboratory.”
He warned that battlefield conditions change rapidly—frequency bands become jammed, navigation systems degrade, and countermeasures evolve within weeks or months.
“Today GPS works, tomorrow it doesn’t,” he said. “The side that adapts faster will win.”
This emphasis on decentralised innovation, he suggested, is central to Ukraine’s current operational approach: pushing rapid iteration of unmanned systems at the unit level rather than relying solely on centralized procurement or doctrine.
Analysts broadly agree that logistics disruption has become a defining feature of modern warfare, particularly in conflicts where front lines are static but supply chains stretch deep into rear areas.
If sustained, Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign could further complicate Russia’s ability to concentrate forces, particularly in regions where infrastructure is vulnerable and air defenses are stretched thin.
However, the long-term effectiveness of such a strategy will depend on several factors: the speed of Russian adaptation, the durability of Ukrainian production and modification capacity, and the evolving role of AI-enabled targeting systems in contested environments.
For now, the campaign underscores a broader shift in warfare—one where relatively inexpensive unmanned systems, combined with software-driven targeting and decentralized innovation, can exert strategic effects far beyond the immediate battlefield.
As the officer put it, the decisive factor is no longer sheer mass.
“It is not about the number of tanks or aircraft,” he said. “It is about who can adapt faster.”
